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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s: THE
SUPREME COURT’S ACCOMMODATION OF
PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THEORY
MARK TUSHNET†
ABSTRACT
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Progressive politicians
and legal theorists advocated the creation and then the expansion of
administrative agencies. These agencies, they argued, could address
rapidly changing social circumstances more expeditiously than could
courts and legislatures, and could deploy scientific expertise, rather
than mere political preference, in solving the problems social change
produced. The proliferation of administrative agencies in the New
Deal—the SEC, the NLRB, and others—meant that defending
administrative agencies from close judicial oversight became
intertwined with defending the New Deal itself. In a series of
contentious cases decided by the Hughes Court, Progressives believed
that they had suffered loss after loss. And, counting only outcomes,
they had. Yet by the end of the decade, the Court had moved
administrative law closer to the position the Progressives had sought.
This Lecture examines developments in administrative law in the
1930s. Focusing on three major cases during that decade, this Lecture
describes how far administrative law adapted to the vision articulated
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by Progressive scholars, most notably Felix Frankfurter and James
Landis. In each case, Progressives believed that the Court had
substantially eroded the accomplishments of administrative law; but
in each, Progressives were mistaken. And whereas the Progressives
failed to acknowledge how much they had gained from the Supreme
Court during the 1930s, by the end of that decade, their opponents
better understood what had occurred and mobilized political support
to retrench. Only a presidential veto stood in the way of a substantial
revision of administrative law. That veto, though, allowed modern
administrative law to adapt to the changing place of administrative
agencies in the modern administrative state.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1900 and 1930, Progressive politicians and legal
theorists advocated the adoption and then the expansion of
administrative agencies. These agencies could address rapidly
changing social circumstances more expeditiously than could courts
and legislatures, and could deploy scientific expertise, rather than
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mere political preference, in solving the problems produced by social
change. The Supreme Court initially was skeptical about the
proposition that the new administrative state could fit easily into the
American constitutional order. But by the time Charles Evans
Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930, the Court had accommodated
the administrative state, in part because the advocates for
administrative agencies tempered their claims out of the prudential
concern that seeking too much would lead the Court to reject the
administrative state entirely.
Yet Progressive legal theorists never fully abandoned their
defense of what Roscoe Pound pejoratively called “administrative
absolutism,” and the economic crisis that began in 1929 gave them the
opportunity to press aggressively forward. The proliferation of
administrative agencies in the New Deal—the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), and more—meant that defending administrative agencies
from close judicial oversight became intertwined with defending the
1
New Deal itself. In a series of contentious cases decided by the
Hughes Court, Progressives believed that they had suffered loss after
2
loss. And, counting only outcomes, they had. Yet by the end of the
decade, the Court had moved administrative law closer to the
3
position the Progressives had sought. Ironically, by the time the
Court had accommodated the Progressive theory of administrative
law, the way agencies functioned in the political system was beginning
to change. Interest-group bargaining—a form of politics—was
relocated into administrative agencies, and the Progressive claim that
administrative agencies pursued science rather than politics became
difficult to sustain. The Progressive vision remained dominant,
though, and its association with the New Deal produced a political
reaction that resulted in the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946.
This Lecture, part of a larger work in progress on the Supreme
Court under Charles Evans Hughes, examines developments in
administrative law in the 1930s. Part I lays out administrative law
theory as articulated by Progressive scholars, most notably Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis, and sketches some of the changes that
scholars identified by the end of the decade. Part II turns to the
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B–D.
3. See infra Part II.E.
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Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1930s. After describing how far
administrative law had adapted to the Progressive vision by 1930 and
how it had changed by 1940, Part II examines three major cases in
some detail. The discussions show how, in each case, Progressives
believed that the Court had substantially eroded the accomplishments
of administrative law, and how, in each, Progressives were mistaken.
Part III describes the political reaction to developments in
administrative law and practice, arguing that while the Progressives
failed to acknowledge how much they had gained from the Supreme
Court, their opponents mobilized political support to retrench. Only a
presidential veto stood in the way of a substantial revision of
administrative law. That veto, though, allowed modern administrative
law to adapt to the changing place of agencies in the modern
administrative state. The Lecture concludes with a brief observation
about the shift from the Constitution to statutes as the means by
which the administrative state would be controlled after 1940.
I. PROGRESSIVES AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE SCHOLARLY
VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Progressive legal theorists defended the rise of the administrative
state. For them, the rapidity of social and economic change rendered
the traditional tripartite scheme of government outmoded: neither
legislatures nor courts could respond quickly enough, or with enough
expertise, to the problems generated by change. Progressives
presented a vision of the administrative state less through a series of
propositions than through an account of its inevitability and therefore
its constitutionality. Their examination of the administrative state in
operation led them to conclude that administrative agencies ought to
be freed from close judicial supervision, at least if the agencies were
reformed to fit the Progressives’ model.
A. Felix Frankfurter and James Landis on Administrative Law
In 1930, Felix Frankfurter delivered the Dodge Lectures at Yale
University. The lecture series was devoted to the “responsibilities of
citizenship,” and previous lecturers included distinguished public
servants, such as then-Judge William Howard Taft in 1906 and
Charles Evans Hughes in 1910. Frankfurter decided to speak on “The
Public and Its Government,” providing a summary of Progressive
ideas about modern government and, in particular, on the necessity of
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administrative rather than legislative regulation of the modern state.
Eight years later, James Landis, a Harvard Law professor turned New
5
Dealer turned dean at Harvard, gave the Storrs Lectures on “The
6
Administrative Process,” also at Yale. The two sets of lectures
provide bookends to the story told by Progressives of administrative
law through the 1930s.
Frankfurter and Landis sounded some of the same themes early
and late. The New Deal experience produced some modest revisions
of those themes, hinting at the larger rethinking that was to come
after 1941.
Frankfurter and Landis emphasized the rapidity of social and
economic change. Frankfurter began with a description of the “new
material forces” provoking “swiftly moving changes” in American
society in the late nineteenth century and afterwards—population
growth, urbanization, and the extension of the nation’s railroad
7
network. Like Frankfurter’s, Landis’s story began early in the
nineteenth century, when “the functions of government were limited
essentially to the prevention of disorder, protection from foreign
invasion, the enlargement of national boundaries, the stimulation of
international trade, and the creation of a scheme of officials to settle
8
civil disputes.”
Next, they emphasized the inability of legislatures, political
parties, and courts to respond adequately and promptly to that
change. As Frankfurter put it, before 1887, state laws “dealt with
simple situations in a simple way, most frequently forbidding
whatever mischief revealed itself as needing more than individual
9
corrective.” Frankfurter criticized the Court for limiting the ability of

4. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930).
5. See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 29–42, 79
(1980).
6. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
7. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 7–10. He also wrote, “Following the Civil War there
was an almost magical industrial growth,” and “[v]ast physical forces have produced great social
changes.” Id. at 23. Measuring social change by the number of patents issued and laws enacted,
Frankfurter observed that the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887
“dates the break with the simplicities of the past” and “begins the new era of governmental
regulation and administrative control.” Id. at 25.
8. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 6. He continued by observing that industrialism and “the rise
of democracy” caused “social maladjustments,” which required rectification. Id. at 7–8.
9. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 14–15. Frankfurter understood that party government
meant patronage government, which he contrasted with the Progressive ideal of government by
experts: “[t]he interplay between government and the complicated structure of industrial society
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states to innovate. “The states need the amplest scope for energy and
individuality in dealing with the myriad problems created by our
complex industrial civilization. They need wide latitude in devising
ways and means for paying the bills of society and in using taxation as
10
an instrument of social policy.” Elaborating on the difficulties
presented to traditional institutions, Landis described legislative
efforts to regulate directly by enacting statutes addressing specific
11
problems. These statutes, though, were “crude and useless,” and
were always too late, addressing problems that had often faded into
12
insignificance by the time legislatures acted. Common law remedies
administered in the courts were not much better, by Landis’s account.
Depending on the initiative of aggrieved parties or public
prosecutors, these remedies “were more apparent than real because
of the costly and uncertain character of the legal actions that had to

demands as never before men of independence and disinterestedness in public life.” Id. at 34–
35.
10. Id. at 48. For Frankfurter, against the “drastic transformation” in the late nineteenth
century, “members of the Supreme Court continued to reflect the social and economic order in
which they grew up.” Id. at 44–45. Because “[t]hey sought to stereotype ephemeral facts into
legal absolutes,” they wrote “abstract conceptions concerning ‘liberty of contract’ . . . into
constitutional dogmas.” Id. at 45. Although the Court’s “hostility to legislation reached its crest”
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and then receded, “those who had hoped that this
deeper insight . . . into the realities of modern society would endure, were to be disappointed.”
FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 46. Frankfurter observed that the Court since 1920 had
“invalidated more such legislation than in the fifty years preceding,” and “always by a divided
Court, always over the protest of its most distinguished minds!” Id. at 47.
Frankfurter’s critique of the Supreme Court was comprehensive: the Court’s decisions
on federalism, substantive limitations on government power, and separation of powers all failed
in devising constitutional rules allowing government to respond to “[o]ur rapid
industrialization” and “[t]he pressure of practical necessities.” Id. at 66. To Frankfurter,
“Government means experimentation,” and “[o]pportunity must be allowed for vindicating
reasonable belief by experience.” Id. at 49. The Supreme Court’s “veto power . . . over the
social-economic legislation of the states . . . is the most vulnerable aspect of undue
centralization.” Id. at 50. It was
at once the most destructive and the least responsible: the most destructive, because
judicial nullification . . . stops experimentation at its source, and bars increase to the
fund of social knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error; the least responsible,
because it so often turns on the fortuitous circumstances which determine a majority
decision and shelters the fallible judgment of individual Justices, in matters of fact
and opinion not peculiarly within the special competence of judges, behind the
impersonal dooms of the Constitution.
Id. at 50–51. A single Justice’s “tip of . . . mind or . . . fears[] may determine the opportunity of a
much needed social experiment to survive, or may frustrate for a long time intelligent attempts
to deal with a social evil.” Id. at 51.
11. See LANDIS, supra note 6, at 9 (noting the failure of early legislative attempts to
regulate railroad charges and tariffs).
12. Id.
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13

be pursued.” Courts’ sporadic interventions left them unable “to
maintain a long-time, uninterrupted interest in a relatively narrow
14
and carefully defined area of economic and social activity.” The
adjustments that were needed, Landis wrote, “could not be achieved
15
through the intermittent intervention of the judicial process.” For
Landis, “The administrative process [was], in essence, [his]
generation’s answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the
16
legislative processes.”
They insisted that experts should lead in making policy through
modern administrative agencies. The solution to the problems of
responding to rapid change was “a permanent, professional
administrative agency” that could deal with “the demands of law
upon economic enterprise” through “the continuity of study, the slow
building up of knowledge, the stimulation of experiments”—“new
political inventions responsive to the pressure of new economic and
17
social facts.” As Landis put it, administrative agencies could provide
“continuing concern with and control over the economic forces which
18
affect the life of the community.”

13. Id.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 46. As another student of administrative law put it, “the inadequacy of the
common-law processes and . . . the shortcomings of direct statutory regulation” produced the
modern administrative agency. 1 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION:
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 287 (1931).
17. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 72–73, 88. Railroad and utility regulation provided
Frankfurter’s examples. See id. at 83–88 (outlining how States followed Congress’s
establishment of the ICC by establishing independent administrative bodies to overcome “[t]he
incapacity of the existing system of regulation to cope with revealed abuses and the emergence
of new forms of public services”). Public-utility regulation was “perhaps the most significant
political tendency at the turn of the century,” because it responded to “the political influences
[the utilities] exerted, the technological advances,” and, perhaps most important, “the
feebleness of existing machinery and procedure for control.” Id. at 83. States and then the
national government developed new “instruments and processes through which sound relations
between public utilities and the public could work themselves out.” Id. at 86. They created
“nonpolitical administrative agenc[ies] . . . , presumably expert and disinterested and equipped
with the necessary technical aid, charged with securing to the public at reasonable cost services
adequate according to modern technological standards and assuring to the utilities a fair income
to make possible these services.” Id. at 86–87. When the regulated industries raised
constitutional challenges, “[h]appily, statesmanship triumphed,” with state courts and the
Supreme Court finding constitutional doctrine “adaptable to the new exigencies of government”
and rejecting the argument that these new “devices” were unconstitutional “merely because
[they] exercised functions which, as a matter of logical analysis, partook of all three forms of
governmental power.” Id. at 87–88.
18. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 8.
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[E]xpertness . . . . springs only from that continuity of interest, that
ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to
a particular problem. . . . [T]he art of regulating an industry requires
knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift
requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the
pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency,
and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to
19
policy.
20

They rejected close judicial oversight of agency decisions. For
example, the Court had required that rates provide a fair return on
investment, which Frankfurter thought rested on “essentially
economic” premises, but “no judicial pronouncements upon matters
fundamentally economic run so counter to the views of economists as
do the more recent utterances of the Supreme Court,” which were
“based upon unrealities, [were] financially unsound, and [led] to
21
uncertainty and speculation.”
They understood that existing agencies did not conform to their
ideal, but both sought internal reform of administrative agencies
rather than substantial external supervision, especially supervision by

19. Id. at 23–24; see also id. at 152 (“Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is
related to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such questions.” (emphasis
omitted)).
20. “[T]he tendency over the past few decades has been to decrease rather than to increase
the power of judges to impose checks upon the exercise of administrative power.” Id. at 100; see
also id. at 142 (“[T]he expertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate procedures, can
be trusted . . . .”).
To Frankfurter, the Court’s doctrines on separation of powers were somewhat less
vulnerable to criticism than its due process holdings. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 77.
The “shrewd men of the world who framed the Constitution” knew that doctrine had to give
political actors “latitude . . . in a work-a-day world,” and, “barring some recent decisions,” the
Court had agreed, refusing “to draw abstract analytical lines of separation” and recognizing
“necessary areas of interaction among the departments of government.” Id. at 77–78. This
allowed Congress “to move with freedom in modern fields of legislation, with their great
complexity and shifting facts, calling for technical knowledge and skill in administration.” Id. at
78. He concluded his second 1930 lecture with the observation that “[e]nforcement of a rigid
conception of separation of powers would make modern government impossible.” Id. But,
Frankfurter continued, “pessimism has supplanted the earlier feeling of hope.” Id. at 92. The
catalogue of difficulties was long, including the “failure . . . to reflect decreased operating
costs[,] . . . the costly futility of rate proceedings[,] . . . [and the] failure to exercise skilled
initiative in the promotion of the public interest”—all leading to an increase of “the impotence
of the individual” and the diminution of “the mastery of law over these enterprises.” Id. at 93.
Nonetheless, “the current judicial approach” was at “[t]he heart of the difficulty.” Id. at 101.
21. Id. at 101–03.
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22

the courts. For Frankfurter, the agencies themselves were unable to
23
cope with the tasks they had been given. Part of the difficulty lay
with legislatures, which had not given the agencies the support they
needed: “[t]he men intrusted with the task ha[d] almost everywhere
been overburdened by details, inadequately staffed, denied necessary
technical aid, subjected to short tenures, dependent on meager
salaries, and generally restricted to appropriations which produce
24
humdrum routine.” With a Progressive’s confidence that merely
exposing difficulties in government would lead to reform, Frankfurter
called not for a re-imagining of how administrative agencies could
25
operate in the “work-a-day” world, but for reinvigorating the
Progressive ideal:
The complex problems of regulation call for a governmental agency
qualified by experience, fortified by technical assistance, free from
the pulls and pressures of politics, generating an esteem in the public
such as the public now entertains for the judiciary, a public esteem
which in its turn will arouse in these officials enterprise, courage,
26
and devotion to the public good.

22. Legislatures had allowed “too many mediocre lawyers” to be “appointed for political
considerations,” and had treated agencies “not as means for solving difficult problems of
government, but as opportunities for political advancement or more profitable future
association” with the regulated industries. Id. at 114. Though “utility regulation at its best
call[ed] for fresh energy and newer resources to cope with the new and greater tasks that now
confront it,” there was “inequality in expertise, in will, in energy, in imagination, between the
utilities and government.” Id. at 112–13. Looking at agency personnel, Frankfurter observed
that “[e]xcept for occasional men of great capacity and exceptional devotion to the public
interest, the technical staffs of the commissions, their engineers and accountants, [were] . . . no
match for the experts against whom they [were] pitted.” Id. at 115. Taking the relatively new
Federal Power Commission as his example, Frankfurter argued that “a few subordinates,
subjected to great temptations and with appropriations from Congress so meager as to starve
their efforts, [were] hardly equipped to meet complacency and legalism within the Commission
and the pressure of acute and powerful forces without.” Id. at 119–20. Frankfurter noted that
“one of the patent facts about our system” was “[t]hat the level of professionalism, of trained
capacity, in our administration of criminal justice is very low.” Id. at 154–55.
23. Id. at 112–13.
24. Id. at 113.
25. Id. at 77.
26. Id. at 122. One of Frankfurter’s students had expressed his own skepticism about
staffing administrative agencies:
In the long run, and until current ideals of public service change very radically, it
cannot be expected that a government commission, paying modest salaries and
exposed to the vicissitudes of political life, can command the services of those supermen whose decisions are always made of the substance of justice and wisdom . . . .
GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCEDURE 328 (1924). James Landis noted that “trial examiners’ staffs on the
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Perhaps most important, Frankfurter and Landis worried that
expert administrative agencies—however effective they were as
instruments of governance—might lack democratic legitimacy. Both
men struggled to articulate accounts that explained why agencies
were indeed properly democratic. Frankfurter’s fourth and final
lecture sought to explain how the Progressive vision of modern
government through expert agencies comported with democratic
ideals. Glancing at Soviet Russia and fascist Italy, Frankfurter
described democracy as relying on “more plodding popular
27
institutions.” But “democracy is the reign of reason on the most
extensive scale. It seeks to prevail when the complexities of life make
a demand upon knowledge and understanding never made
28
before . . . .”
Resolving the deeper problems of American
government required a new understanding of democracy. Because
“the staples of contemporary politics . . . are deeply enmeshed in
intricate and technical facts,” they “must be extricated from
29
presupposition and partisanship.” Instead, the nation needed
“systematic effort to contract the area of conflict and passion and
30
widen the area of accredited knowledge as the basis of action.”
Frankfurter disclaimed the possibility that he was “suggesting
that the conquest of science calls for a new type of oligarchy, namely,

whole have too little competence” because of low salaries and “the rigid requirements of civil
service rules.” LANDIS, supra note 6, at 104.
27. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 123. Frankfurter praised the British system of a
permanent and prestigious civil service for eliciting “talent . . . [in] public administration,” but
noted that “it is wholly wrong to expect civilized standards of public service from officials whose
salaries are too low to enable them to meet the minimum standards of cultivated life.” Id. at 136,
139. Adapting that system to the United States would mean that “government [would] have at
its disposal the resources of training and capacity equipped to understand and deal with the
complicated issues to which these technological forces give rise.” Id. at 151. For Frankfurter, the
American spoils system reflected “a crude logic of democracy and the versatile energy of the
pioneer,” but was inadequate “in the modern world,” which required more than “the simple
virtues of honesty and public devotion.” Id. at 147, 150.
28. Id. at 127.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Id. As Frankfurter acknowledged, “[A]gitation and advocacy have their place.” Id. at
153. They were
instruments of education, means for making effective the findings of knowledge and
the lessons of experience. But the quiet, detached, laborious task of disentangling
facts from fiction, of extracting reliable information from interested parties, of
agreeing on what is proof and what surmise, must precede, if agitation is to feed on
knowledge and reality, and be equipped to reach the mind rather than to exploit
feeling.
Id.
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31

government by experts.” For him, “power . . . must more and more
be lodged in administrative experts,” and therefore had to be
32
“properly circumscribed and zealously scrutinized.” This could be
done “through machinery and processes,” but, strikingly, these were
33
not the traditional machinery and processes of law. Nor were they
the processes of politics:
In a democracy, politics is a process of popular education—the task
of adjusting the conflicting interests of diverse groups in the
community, and bending the hostility and suspicion and ignorance
engendered by group interests toward a comprehension of mutual
understanding. For these ends, expertise is indispensable. But
politicians must enlist popular support for the technical means by
34
which alone social policies can be realized.

Rather, the agencies’ democratic legitimacy “largely depend[ed] on
very high standards of professional service, an effective
procedure . . . , easy access to public scrutiny and a constant play of
35
alert public criticism, especially by an informed and spirited bar.”
These “instruments for governing”—“organization, technological
skill, and scientific methods”—were the means by which the end, “the
art of making men live together in peace and with reasonable
36
happiness,” could be pursued.

31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 157–58 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 159–60.
34. Id. at 161.
35. Id. at 159.
36. Id. at 160. “[I]mproving the personnel of administrative agencies” might be desirable,
but until it was accomplished, agencies might lack sufficient democratic justification. Ralph F.
Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538,
567 (1938). Justice Brandeis had observed that “[r]esponsibility is the great developer of men.
May it not tend to emasculate or demoralize the rate-making body if ultimate responsibility is
transferred to others?” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 92 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). For Robert Cooper, the very existence of judicial oversight created a
“vicious circle” in which “the existence of mediocrity” was “caused, at least in part, by the
existing tendency to subordinate administration to a place of inferiority within the framework of
government.” Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE
L.J. 577, 601 (1938). Why, he asked, would “men of ability and competence” want to work in
“such positions of questionable responsibility”? Id. “[M]aking authority coextensive with
responsibility” would, Cooper suggested, improve the quality of the personnel in place even
without any additional actions by the legislature. Id. Only this would preserve “popular
government” from degenerating into “a more efficient form of political authority,” one that
might “sacrific[e] fundamental political ideals.” Id. at 601–02.
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Progressives grudgingly accommodated the courts in the early
years of modern administrative law. The new administrative agencies
faced courts suspicious of the substantive policies the agencies had
been told to pursue and of the lawyers determined to retain lucrative
business. The agencies responded by giving their procedures a judicial
form—for example, holding hearings at which evidence was taken
37
and placing limitations on the use of hearsay evidence. But to
Progressives, agency proceedings could not be fully “judicialized”
without losing the advantages of expertise and relatively quick
responses to new problems. The Progressives were willing to go part
of the way toward procedures resembling those in judicial
proceedings, but their concessions were never enthusiastic. They
wanted to insulate the modern administrative state from judges
supervising the agencies and imposing court-like procedures on them,
and from lawyers who lacked the comprehensive overview of the
38
economic or social problems within each agency’s jurisdiction.
B. I.L. Sharfman on Administrative Law in the Interstate Commerce
Commission
Frankfurter’s lectures described the ideal administrative state.
He knew that the reality in the United States was far from ideal.
Frankfurter’s studies of administrative law led him to support a
research project by the Commonwealth Fund. The Fund
commissioned a series of studies of administrative law—“the extent
to which administrative control has, by modern regulation, been in
39
fact conferred.”

37. See LANDIS, supra note 6, at 141–42 (describing the “great emphasis” Justice Brandeis
placed on the “quasi-judicial” nature of “administrative tribunals”).
38. See supra notes 17–20.
39. Foreword to 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at v. The Fund was founded in 1918 by Anna
Harkness, the widow of one of the founders of Standard Oil Company. Commonwealth Fund
Spent $2,095,911 in 1930, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1931, at 28. It generally focused on supporting
public health, including grants to New York’s social work agencies. Id. During the 1920s, a small
portion of its funds was devoted to legal research, supervised by a committee chaired by George
Welwood Murray, a prominent New York lawyer and an active alumnus of Columbia Law
School. 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at vi. Other committee members included three law school
deans—Roscoe Pound of Harvard, Young Smith of Columbia, and Henry Bates of Michigan—
and the influential Wall Street lawyer Charles C. Burlingham. Id. For an examination of
Frankfurter’s influence on the Commonwealth Fund’s conceptualization of administrative law,
see generally Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A
Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171 (2009). The Fund’s Legal
Research Committee described its interests in classic Progressive terms:
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Gerard C. Henderson, a Frankfurter protégé, wrote the Fund’s
40
first volume, on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Less than a
decade old when the book was published in 1924, the FTC had
struggled to establish coherent antitrust policy. And Henderson’s
book, largely a pedestrian catalogue of the FTC’s work whose
recurrent theme was that the FTC’s decisions rarely explained its
conclusions adequately, did little to support the Progressive vision of
modern administrative law.
Henderson offered the Progressive vision as part, but only part,
of his story about the FTC’s creation. He described the arguments
41
made by Progressive supporters of new legislation sympathetically,
but, he observed, the Progressive impulse was only one of two strands
42
of support for creating the FTC. The other was supplied by
“business men, trade associations, and commercial and industrial
interests to whom the uncertainty of the law had become
43
exasperating.” The FTC’s work, Henderson suggested, was
44
hampered by the conflict inherent in its creation. In area after area,
the Commission failed. Henderson thought an expert agency should
be able to make factual findings about an industry that a court could
45
not, but the FTC’s findings were of “meagre quality.” The “net
result” of the FTC’s cases dealing with contracts between
manufacturers and dealers was “substantially nil,” with findings that

The vast changes wrought in the social and economic aspects of society during the
nineteenth century, due to the introduction of new mechanical forces, the penetrating
influence of science, large scale industry and progressive urbanization have reflected
themselves in a steady extension of legal control of social and economic interests.
HENDERSON, supra note 26, at v. At first, legislatures tried to intervene through statutes
“depending . . . for enforcement upon the rigid, cumbersome and inevitably ineffective
machinery of the criminal law.” Id. Administrative “instruments,” which “greatly widened the
field of discretion,” were the new mode of regulation. Id. The Fund’s project involved
examining “the actual workings of carefully selected administrative organs . . . [as] a
prerequisite for an appraisal of what administrative law really does.” Id. at vi–vii.
40. HENDERSON, supra note 26.
41. Id. at 18–19 (“The forms of unfair and oppressive competition are myriad. By the time
Congress has discovered and defined a dozen, a dozen more will be devised and put in
operation. A tribunal should be created, with power to mold and adapt the law to each new
situation. Since business and economic problems will be encountered, as well as questions of
law, the power should be lodged with a commission composed of eminent lawyers, economists,
business men, and publicists . . . .”).
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 83–87 (noting that the Commission neither maintained judicial independence
nor provided promptness and speed).
45. Id. at 116.
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“appear[ed] to be peculiarly barren of the fruits of economic research
and understanding, and to an unusual degree the products of legalism
46
and dogma.” And, betraying a core premise of the Progressive case
for administrative agencies, “the Federal Trade Commission [was]
47
not primarily built for speed” because of its judicialized
procedures—themselves the product of the compromise between
48
Progressives and commercial interests.
Henderson offered a bleak picture of the administrative state in
action. But it was not the only picture available to Progressives like
Frankfurter. At the end of the 1930s, Frankfurter urged his Harvard
colleagues to award that year’s James Barr Ames Prize for the best
book on law to another product of the Commonwealth Fund project,
lawyer-economist Isaiah Leo Sharfman’s comprehensive treatise on
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Calling it “a
monumental work,” Frankfurter told his colleague Zechariah Chafee
that Sharfman’s work offered a “perspective” on “the whole domain
49
of what we call administrative law.”
For Frankfurter, Sharfman’s work exemplified the Progressive
understanding of administrative law after a half decade of New Deal
experience. It offered a positive case for the administrative state to
50
offset Henderson’s skepticism. Sharfman was a meticulous scholar
who eventually wrote five volumes on the ICC. The first of these,
published in 1931, reflected the Progressive vision in almost pristine
form. By 1937, when the final volume appeared, Sharfman’s
perspective had shifted subtly as New Deal experience accumulated.
But even in the final volume, he defended the Progressive vision of
administrative law in almost the same terms that Frankfurter had
used in 1930.

46. Id. at 316–17.
47. Id. at 86.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Zechariah Chafee (Mar. 11, 1939) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library).
50. Born in Russia in 1886, Sharfman graduated from Harvard College in 1907 and from
the Law School in 1910. HARVARD COLLEGE CLASS OF 1907: SECRETARY’S REPORT NO. III,
1907–1913, at 267 (1913). In 1912 the Chinese revolution forced Sharfman to give up his
teaching post in China in law and political science to take a job on the staff of the National Civic
Federation studying the regulation of public utilities. Id. Appointed in 1913 to lecture on
political economy in the economics department at the University of Michigan, Sharfman
remained at Michigan until his retirement in 1955. Isaiah L. Sharfman, Economist, Teacher,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1969, at 47.
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Sharfman’s work was a comprehensive overview of the ICC’s
work from 1887 to the 1930s, filled with long excerpts from
Commission decisions and reports, and from Supreme Court
opinions. On its opening pages, the work stated the Progressive
explanation for the rise and value of administrative agencies: “the
very existence of an expert and continuously functioning body has
facilitated the evolution of governmental policies responsive to public
51
needs and realistically adjusted to meet those needs.” He concluded
his third volume, published in 1935 and affected by the role of
administrative agencies in the early New Deal, with a reflection on
the possibility that the ICC would make “a courageous use of
52
regulatory machinery” as it had in the past. The ICC, he suggested,
“may be blazing trails and accumulating experience, in a degree never
53
suspected in 1920, toward a fuller public control of all industry.”
Though the ICC was the model modern administrative agency, it
was not perfect. Sometimes its commissioners erred. Most often their
mistakes were not intrinsic to the administrative enterprise. So, for
example, Congress might have asked them to address a discrete
problem whose solution would interfere with the comprehensive
54
regulatory system the ICC generally pursued. Or the ICC might
have misstepped because Congress had refused to give it the
55
resources it needed to do its job. On a more general level, the
agency’s “determination to do ‘a common sense job’ was quite in
accord with the [ICC’s] generally pragmatic processes. In terms of any
51. 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 2. Sharfman repeated these views throughout his work,
to ensure that a reader confronting volume two or four would learn what the reader who had
started with volume one already knew. The fourth volume, for example, opened with a
reference to the “constantly changing circumstances and conditions” under which the
“development of regulatory policy could not have been achieved without resort to the
administrative method of control.” 4 id. at 5 (1937).
52. 3A id. at 627 (1935).
53. Id. Sharfman was quite lavish with his praise of the Commission’s work. He offered
“high commendation” to the Commission’s “successful attack” on “palpably indefensible forms
of favoritism.” 3B id. at 755 (1936). The agency’s work during World War I was “sufficiently
impressive to establish the need of removing the traditional legal obstacles to concert of action.”
1 id. at 173.
54. See 1 id. at 225–27. A congressional directive to require that railroads provide
“interchangeable mileage or scrip coupon tickets” was “passed largely under the pressure of
commercial travelers’ organizations,” and “the fact that Congress has sought, directly, to further
special ends, may exert an unwholesome influence upon the independence of the Commission
and upon the dominance of the method of administrative control.” Id. at 226–27.
55. See id. at 9 (“Both thoroughness of consideration and promptness of decision, which
are presumed to characterize the administrative method of control, tend to become very
difficult, if not impossible, of attainment.”).
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absolute standard of accuracy, there was doubtless error; but such
error was not grounded in arbitrary procedure, nor did it issue in
56
flagrant departure from fact.”
Occasionally, though, Sharfman hinted at, and may even himself
have glimpsed, deeper difficulties with the administrative enterprise.
The ICC’s core mission was to create a rational regulatory system for
railroads, setting prices and determining routes that promoted
57
national well-being. Most of that work involved economics—using
accounting principles to determine the present value of past capital
investments or the replacement cost for existing capital.
Sharfman also believed the ICC could have used economic
science to determine the proper rate of return on investment. The
difficulties the ICC encountered in doing so were technical, not
normative. Sharfman understood that, in Congress’s view and the
ICC’s, national well-being included more than mere economics. It
included safety and providing access to rail transportation to
otherwise isolated communities. Sharfman knew that integrating
these “broad social ends” within an economically rational system
plainly lay outside the domain of economic science and might
undermine such a system: safety regulations, for example, had effects
58
on the quality and cost of service, the ICC’s primary focus. In effect,
Sharfman threw up his hands, observing that the ICC had sensibly
given relatively little weight to such social considerations. He did not
seem to think that the ICC’s experience in this area had cast any
doubt on the Progressive enterprise of deploying science and
expertise in administrative agencies.
Sharfman’s enthusiasm for administrative agencies gave him
strong views about other organs of government. For him, all that
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts could do was
interfere with the agency’s use of science and expertise. Congress had
one positive role: it could create an administrative agency and then
59
delegate authority to it in the broadest terms. Otherwise, Congress

56. 3A id. at 164–65 (1935).
57. 1 id. at 3–5.
58. Id. at 248.
59. Sharfman understood that “[t]he very existence and jurisdictional scope of these
administrative agencies is dependent upon and constantly subject to modification by statutory
enactment” and that the ICC was “constantly performing legislative functions . . . guided by the
standards of action prescribed by Congress.” Id. at 287. But, he continued, “these standards are
usually couched in such generality of terms as to leave open an almost uncharted discretion in
the disposal of specific proceedings.” Id. at 7. The ICC was to determine whether rates were
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had only negative effects on the administrative process. Prodded by
narrow interest groups that lacked the comprehensive overview the
ICC had, Congress would direct the ICC to solve some quite isolated
problem. The ICC’s expertise often did not extend to the problem
turned over to it, and even when the problem was generically
appropriate, addressing it would undermine the ICC’s comprehensive
60
plan for the railroad industry. The ICC’s “tasks” were “so intimately
intertwined” that “the more or less arbitrary infusion of extraneous
influences, however well intentioned, [was] bound to render difficult
the maintenance of unswerving adherence to reasoned conclusions
61
and permanently significant standards of action.” Sharfman
understood the ICC’s “apparent sidetracking” of action in response
to a congressional directive, though he could not bring himself to
62
approve the “deliberate disregard of the legislative will.” Sharfman’s
skepticism about what Congress could contribute to the modern
administrative state suggests that, for him, the best world would be
one in which administrative agencies came into being by immaculate
conception.
The presidency was no better. Presidents tried “to mold the
general course or direction of regulatory policy through manipulation
63
of the appointing power.” They assumed that “the Commission
[was] part of the national administration and hence [was] a proper
64
medium for the expression of political policy.” But it was not—no
more so than was the Supreme Court—“and executive influence
[was] as manifestly out of place in the one case as it would be in the
65
other.” Sharfman thought that presidents should appoint experts to
agencies, but too often they allowed narrow political considerations—

“just” and “reasonable” and in “the public interest,” but there were “no objective and definitive
tests of ‘justness,’ or ‘reasonableness,’ or ‘public interest.’” Id. But “[w]ithin the bounds of such
vaguely defined ends, the Commission . . . exercise[d] virtually unrestricted authority.” Id. at
287–88. The absence of such objective tests ensured that the agency would have the flexibility
needed to adapt solutions to ever-changing problems, and Congress had become accustomed to
granting the agency such broad powers because “in great measure” it had been persuaded by
the ICC’s “experience” and “influence” that broad delegations promoted the public good. Id. at
2.
60. See, e.g., id. at 229–30 (discussing Congress’s interest in the transport of agricultural
products).
61. Id. at 230–31.
62. 3A id. at 482 (1935).
63. 2 id. at 453.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 454.
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geography being the most important one for the ICC—to dictate
66
choice. He had generally high regard for the ICC’s members, yet for
him it was simply a happy coincidence that politics converged with
expertise often enough. Nor did presidents provide the public support
for the agency that it needed to become as important in the public’s
mind as the courts were. Instead of urging that the public accept
whatever the agency did as the result of the honest application of
expertise, presidents evaluated the ICC’s work independently, on the
merits rather than deferentially, and once again with politics primarily
67
in mind.
In Sharfman’s view, the courts, too, should have been kept away
from administrative agencies. Courts saw the ICC’s work only when
someone brought an appeal challenging an agency decision. That
meant that they did not see how the agency was operating overall or
how a particular decision, which might to an outsider seem
questionable, fit into a larger scheme the ICC had developed. The
early ICC “was hindered by the open hostility of the railroads and the
68
unsympathetic attitude of the courts.”
Fortunately, the era in which the courts were deeply hostile to
administrative agencies had passed, and they had come to accept
69
agencies as valuable instruments of modern governance.
Constitutional doctrine was far more generous to the ICC than it had
been in the agency’s early years—though not, in Sharfman’s eyes,
quite generous enough. Thankfully, “the courts [had] adopted a
dominantly self-denying attitude in matters of review,” although
Sharfman could not resist observing that this “was not characteristic
of the Commission’s status during the first two decades of its
70
existence.” When the courts looked at agency procedures, their
sporadic interventions were rarely helpful, and Sharfman commended

66. See id. at 458–65 & nn.211–14 (describing incidents in which presidential
administrations were alleged to have unduly emphasized political considerations in the
appointment of ICC personnel).
67. See, e.g., id. at 455–58 (discussing examples from the Harding and Hoover
administrations).
68. 1 id. at 23–24.
69. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“Through a self-denying interpretation of their own functions in the
prevailing scheme of control . . . the courts have progressively narrowed the scope of judicial
review.”).
70. 2 id. at 385.
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the ICC for going to Congress for relief when judicial decisions had
71
“left serious gaps in the Commission’s functioning jurisdiction.”
Sharfman published his final volumes after the nation had seen
how some early New Deal agencies operated, and the later books had
a slightly more skeptical and less enthusiastic tone than the first
volumes. Modern conditions, it seemed, deprived administrative
agencies of the very advantages over courts and legislatures—the
ability to take a comprehensive view and the ability to respond
quickly to changing circumstances—around which Progressives had
organized their defense of those agencies. Sharfman criticized the
ICC for its “[f]ailure [during World War I] to recognize the
72
seriousness of the war emergency,” and for ignoring “the practical
needs of the railroad situation during the critical years that were
73
ushered in by the World War.” He acknowledged that “[b]road
adjustments [had] proved to be extremely complex and very difficult
to carry out. They [were] too time-consuming to meet pressing
demands and when completed changed circumstances [might]
74
undermine their applicability.” Responding in part to political
challenges to the New Deal’s administrative apparatus and in part to
their new understanding of how agencies actually operated, the
Progressives’ heirs began to offer a more chastened view of the
75
modern administrative state.
C. Freund and Dickinson on Administrative Law: Review of Law
and Review of Facts
Early in the twentieth century, Ernst Freund imported
continental ideas about administrative law to the United States.
Trained in Germany, Freund taught at the University of Chicago Law
School, and, during the 1910s and early 1920s, he was the leading
76
figure in the field of administrative law. Freund’s scholarship
focused on using law to bring administrative discretion under control.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 423.
3B id. at 92 (1936).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 765.
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81
IOWA L. REV. 149, 158 (1995) (noting that 1960s intellectuals “began to argue that regulatory
agencies were costly to operate and often prone to error”).
76. Frankfurter surpassed Freund as the 1920s proceeded. For an account of the
intellectual and institutional competition between Freund and Frankfurter, see generally Ernst,
supra note 39.
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Legislatures would exercise that control in the first instance by
carefully delineating the domain of administrative discretion. Freund
had great hopes for legislative control of administrative discretion,
but he understood that some discretion would always remain with
administrative agencies. They could comply with the rule of law,
Freund thought, by incrementally moving from broad discretionary
standards to more precise rules, and indeed perhaps even better rules
77
than the legislature could devise. For Freund, this was the model of
how the rule of law would operate in the administrative state: careful
delegation of power by legislatures, coupled with the elaboration of
rules by agencies themselves.
Administrative law in the United States adopted part of Freund’s
solution, as courts tried to insist that legislatures give real guidance to
administrative agencies. But by the 1920s, that effort had largely
failed, as Freund may have understood. Yet American administrative
law barely had a theory of administrative self-regulation—rules
generated within agencies that would govern their own activities and
that would fit agencies into a rule-of-law regime. Instead, U.S.
administrative law unquestioningly accepted another part of the latenineteenth-century compromise: courts would have full power to
review agencies’ decisions interpreting the law those agencies were
administering. Frankfurter’s students chastised Freund for advocating
strict legislative control of administrative discretion, without fully
appreciating Freund’s admittedly secondary mechanism of evolving
78
rules from standards.
Unrestricted judicial review of agency legal interpretations,
though, was in tension with the vision of administrative autonomy
held by Progressive theorists. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court,

77. Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 666, 669, 671–72 (1915) (“Administrative action has . . . the indisputable . . . advantage,
that it permits the process of establishing rules to be surrounded by procedural guaranties and
other inherent checks which will tend to produce a more impartial consideration than the
legislature is apt to give, and [this] should in course of time, if not immediately, substitute
principle for mere discretion. . . . [Agencies would] evolve principle out of constantly recurrent
action.”).
78. John Dickinson, Book Review, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 981, 985 (1928) (reviewing
ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1928); JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (1927)) (criticizing Freund for treating
administrative discretion as “of necessity inherently bad, and [assuming] that all questions can
be justly decided by the yard-stick of fixed rules”). For other criticisms by Frankfurter’s
students, see Ernst, supra note 39, at 184.
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protective of the judicial role, provided little help for Progressive
theorists seeking to develop an account of agency autonomy over
interpreting statutes. Still, by the end of the 1930s, Progressive
theorists began to glimpse a path to such autonomy. They argued, and
the Court came to agree, that agencies should have substantial leeway
in determining facts. But, as John Dickinson had urged in his 1927
treatise on administrative law, the distinction between facts and law
was vague, and drawing it inevitably implicated the very policy
questions that Progressive theorists believed the agencies themselves
should decide. For Dickinson, it was impossible “to establish a clear
line between so-called ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact’ by any
79
substantive test of definition.” Rather, “[A]ny factual state or
relation which the courts . . . regard as sufficiently important to be
made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar character becomes
80
thereby a matter of law . . . .” Administrative agencies applied
general standards to “bridge[] th[e] gap” between “the special
81
subsidiary facts . . . and the ultimate conclusion.” Doing so was
factfinding. The theorists pressed hard to move the line dividing facts
from law, seeking to place as much as they could in the domain of
facts and therefore to guard against aggressive judicial scrutiny. They
achieved little before the early 1940s.
D. A New Vision Begins to Emerge
By the end of the decade, defenders of the administrative state
began to sketch a different defense: agencies were locations in which
democratic politics could occur.
In 1941, Walter Gellhorn described three “great phases” of the
judicial confrontation with the administrative state. In the first, at the
end of the nineteenth century, “alarmed lawyers turned to judges who
were equally alarmed to save what they could from the ravening
82
administrators.” This “begot the impulse to extend and extend
83
judicial review of administration determinations.” In the second
phase, “the burning question was whether and how much a court

79. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 312 (1927).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 315.
82. WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 42 (1941).
83. Id.
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could review (and, in reviewing, revise) administrative judgments.”
Judicial review alone was ineffective, though, partly because judges
“were sometimes less than supermen and were therefore themselves
85
capable of erring,” and partly because judges could not “reach more
86
than a tiny segment of the administrative output.” The second phase,
Progressive commentators agreed, resulted in a tempering of the
87
judicial impulse to extend judicial review.
The third phase, according to Gellhorn, “addressed . . . the
88
procedure of administration itself.” For James Landis, “The positive
reason for declining judicial review over administrative findings of
fact is the belief that the expertness of the administrative, if guarded
by adequate procedures, can be trusted to determine these issues as
89
capably as judges.” Gellhorn, too, was skeptical about “push[ing]
90
beyond the antechamber into the atmosphere of the courtroom.”
91
Administrators should not “slavishly emulate judicial models.”
Agencies had developed adjudicatory techniques that were “surely
the equal of and very probably superior to the more orthodox
92
processes.” Agencies administering social welfare benefits, for
example, were able to gather information “quick[ly] and
93
inexpensive[ly].” Their hearings had “no adversary positions, no
cross-examination, no witness chairs. The claimant [told] his story as
94
he please[d]; sources outside the ‘hearing’ [were] freely admitted.”
Sharfman’s summary of the ICC’s approach to procedure
emphasized the Commission’s “flexible adjustment of its practices to

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 43.
87. To quote Sharfman, “Through a self-denying interpretation of their own functions in
the prevailing scheme of control . . . the courts have progressively narrowed the scope of judicial
review.” 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 7; see also 2 id. at 347 (“For more than two decades . . .
the occasions and grounds of judicial review have been progressively narrowed . . . . This result
has been largely accomplished by the courts themselves . . . .”); 2 id. at 385 (“[T]he courts have
adopted a dominantly self-denying attitude in matters of review. . . . [T]here is a broad and
significant zone in which the Commission’s determinations are clothed with finality . . . . [This]
was not characteristic of the Commission’s status during the first two decades of its existence.”).
88. GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 43.
89. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 142.
90. GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 60–61.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 68.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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95

meet distinctive needs,” and, referring to the Commission’s
treatment of evidentiary questions, concluded that “the Commission
has proceeded in the spirit of the determinations of the courts,
infringing upon when necessary, rather than disregarding as a matter
96
of principle, the established standards.” For Sharfman, “Not only is
the administrative method . . . indispensable to sound and realistic
adjustment of complex relationships in the public interest, but
through the employment of quasi-judicial methods it has flexibly but
97
successfully safeguarded all essential private rights.”
Sharfman’s reference to “infringements” of judicial standards for
the admissibility of evidence was telling. His claim that the
Commission did not reject the judicial model “as a matter of
principle” was undermined by his celebration of the Commission’s
98
procedural flexibility. Perhaps the Commission did not reject the
judicial model as a matter of principle, but it clearly—and to
Sharfman appropriately—was not committed to that model as a
matter of principle from which departures should be made
grudgingly. Sometimes the Commission’s choice of quasi-judicial
procedures converged with the judicial model, not because of
principle but from a contingent evaluation of what the Commission,
not the courts, regarded as a proper accommodation of the public
interest and the demands of fairness. In 1941, Gellhorn offered the
comforting suggestion that “[t]he gap between administrative and
99
judicial practice is fast narrowing” because of transformations in the
courts’ approach to procedure—arguably, a vindication of the
100
agencies’ insistence on procedural flexibility.
The Progressives’ theory of administrative procedure in the
1930s remained what it had been from the outset. In principle, they
believed, agencies should have complete discretion to choose the
procedures determined by experts in the field to be suitable to the
101
particular problems facing each agency. Robert Cooper, a special

95. 4 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 244 (1937).
96. Id. at 212.
97. Id. at 255–56 (footnote omitted).
98. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
99. GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 79.
100. See id. at 78–79 (“Today’s clamorous accusations that administrative agencies flout the
laws of evidence will . . . soon subside. The courts themselves are destroying rigidity in the rules,
leaving them flexible enough to meet varied needs.”).
101. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 36, at 600 (“If modern government is to assume its proper
responsibility in solving the fundamental and perplexing problems of the day with intelligence
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assistant to Attorney General Homer Cummings, offered a
particularly forceful statement in 1938: those who supported what he
called “the doctrine of judicial infallibility” were
presumably of the opinion that an independent tribunal endowed
with the antiquated or cumbersome methods of legal procedure,
steeped in the traditions of the common law and completely isolated
from the previous steps in the administrative process, is the most
suitable agency to determine finally the existence of certain basic
102
facts pertaining to an administrative controversy.

Circumstances would sometimes force agencies to depart from this
principle, but those departures were extraneous impositions on
103
agencies.
Yet looming over all this was the specter of an administrative
104
state completely divorced from democratic control. By the early
1930s, Soviet Russia and fascist Italy had replaced bureaucratic
France as the image of the administrative state degenerating into
tyranny, to be joined in the next few years by Nazi Germany.
Defending “democracy [as] the reign of reason on the most extensive
105
scale,” Frankfurter observed in 1930 that “[s]ensational and violent
rule in Russia and Italy throws out of perspective more plodding
106
popular institutions.” How, though, were those plodding institutions
to be truly popular if they were staffed by professionals and experts?
Toward the end of the 1930s, Progressive theorists found themselves
pressed to defend the democratic legitimacy of administrative
agencies more vigorously than they had at the decade’s outset.
Sometimes they sounded older themes, but the more perceptive of
them began to develop the idea that agency processes themselves
could be a form of democratic participation in decisionmaking.
To some extent, the Progressive theorists of the administrative
state simply asserted that the norms of the experts’ professions were
and foresight, administration must first be accorded a status of autonomy with the functional
structure of the State.”).
102. Id. at 595.
103. See id. at 601–02 (“If the concept of an autonomous system of administration is
generally considered to be irreconcilable with the indispensable safeguards against unlawful
administrative action by reference to the assumption of judicial superiority, popular government
will inevitably give way to a more efficient form of political authority.”).
104. For a discussion of Albert Venn Dicey’s criticisms of the inherent lack of democratic
accountability in administrative regimes, see infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
105. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 127.
106. Id. at 123.
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enough to give popular sanction to the technical exercises in which
107
the professionals were engaged. Frankfurter acknowledged that
“agitation and advocacy have their place” as “instruments of
108
education.” But, he continued, “the quiet, detached, laborious task
of disentangling facts from fiction, of extracting reliable information
from interested parties, of agreeing on what is proof and what
surmise, must precede, if agitation is to feed on knowledge and
109
reality.”
Professionalism alone, then, was insufficient to give the actions
of administrative agencies the popular warrant they required.
Gellhorn argued in 1941 that the very procedures designed to ensure
fairness to the subjects of regulation also “democratize[d] our
governmental processes,” because they “[brought] to the interests
and individuals immediately affected an opportunity to shape the
course of regulation, modeling it to fit the contours of their own
110
special problems.” “Officials in constantly increasing numbers,” he
continued, were “perceiving the significant mutuality of gain flowing
111
from private participation in the administrative process.” That
perception led them to “improve the tools”—the procedures they
112
used—for “securing” that participation. Gellhorn understood that
this raised “certain possibilities of excess” when “official mechanisms
113
[came] wholly under the control of outside pressures.” But he did
114
not see “any element of impropriety in this development,” because
it was “the almost inevitable concomitant of concentration upon a
115
somewhat homogeneous area of control.” For Gellhorn, “A real
picture of government regulation of an industry would not always
show two scowling antagonists, but rather more often two smiling
116
collaborators.” Without any apparent irony intended, Gellhorn
wrote that this was “a very pleasant prospect, indeed, and one which

107. See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 6, at 98–99 (arguing that because agencies “move[] in a
narrow field,” a “professionalism of spirit” will constrain the administrative state and assure
“informed and balanced judgments”).
108. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 153.
109. Id.
110. GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 122.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 131.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 131–32.
116. Id. at 132.
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one would not care to alter—so long as the administrative agency
maintains a residual distinction between governmental regulation and
117
After all, “the unorganized public
industrial self-regulation.”
interest is represented by the agency and . . . there is today no
118
effective substitute for that type of representation.”
E. Summary
By the end of the 1930s, the Progressive theory of administrative
law had begun to take on a new shape. Progressives still sought to
free agencies from close judicial supervision. They pressed the courts
to characterize issues as involving facts—the agencies’ proper
domain—rather than law, the domain of the courts. Experience had
shown, though, that agencies were deeply implicated in politics and
that expertise offered no escape. Incorporating politics into the
theory of administrative law remained a challenge for Progressives.
They started to meet that challenge as they considered what the
Supreme Court had done with administrative law during the decade.
II. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Supreme Court weighed in on administrative law in a series
of cases during the 1930s, both before and after New Deal legislation
created an efflorescence of new agencies such as the SEC, the NLRB,
and others. As the 1930s proceeded—both before and after the New
Deal—constitutional and administrative law moved, more haltingly
than Frankfurter and other Progressives hoped but further than they
acknowledged, toward the Progressive ideal. Frankfurter and other
Progressives, including dissenting Justices, saw the Court’s decisions
as a mix of persistent resistance to the modes of governance required
by modern society with grudging but quite modest accommodation of
traditional doctrine to new problems. Yet the Progressive agenda for
administrative law was, in essence, to liberate agencies from judicial
supervision so that technocracy guided loosely by politics could
replace law. Nothing the Court could do other than withdraw
completely from the field would have comported with that agenda.

117. Id.
118. Id. Again, fascist Italy was the counterimage: agencies had to be objective and not
partisan because “Italian corporativism” was the “logical extension of the partisan-principle,”
hardly a “democratization of administration.” Id. at 144.
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The Hughes Court’s decisions transformed administrative law
without going that far. They greatly expanded the boundaries within
which administrative agencies could operate free of significant
judicial supervision, although the true breadth of the Hughes Court’s
concessions to those agencies would not be apparent until the 1940s,
after Hughes had passed from the scene. As in much of the Hughes
Court’s work, the Court here moved into the terrain Roosevelt’s
appointees hoped the Court would occupy, but left them unsure
about the Court’s exact position. Still, the Progressive critique of
traditional doctrines of administrative law gave them clear ideas
about how to move forward.
A. Background: Administrative Law to 1930
Writing in 1885 and concerned about the incipient displacement
of the common law by administrative law, British jurist Albert Venn
Dicey asserted that the first requirement of the rule of law was that
“no man . . . can be lawfully made to suffer . . . except for a distinct
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the
119
ordinary Courts of the land.” Dicey’s target was the French system
of droit administratif, which he expressly described as a system of
120
unbridled discretion. When his work traveled across the Atlantic,
few proponents of new administrative agencies had anything like that
in mind. Yet the translation was too obvious to avoid, and Dicey’s
dictum became an important component of the conservative
resistance to the development of a distinctive administrative law in
the United States.
Progressive defenders of the modern administrative state could
not accept Dicey’s conception of the rule of law. The whole point of
modern administrative law, in their view, was to supplant the
cumbersome procedures of the “ordinary courts” with agencies that
could rely on their expertise to dispense with some of those
procedures, more deftly responding to rapid social and economic
change, and more efficiently handling cases in large numbers. As the
Progressives increasingly theorized their commitments, they came
close to endorsing the proposition that administrative agencies ought

119. ALBERT VENN DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 175 (3d ed. 1889).
120. See id. at 307 (arguing that under a system of droit administratif “[a]ll dealings . . . in
which the rights of an individual in reference to the state or officials representing the state come
in question, fall within the scope of administrative law”).
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to exercise unbridled discretion. Reality could not match their
theories, of course, and by the 1920s Progressives and conservatives
had reached an accommodation of sorts.
Progressives continued to resist Dicey’s view in principle. When
they could, they disdained the use of the procedures of ordinary
courts. Juvenile courts, for example, ran on principles that departed
121
significantly from those used down the hall in criminal courts.
Elsewhere, though, powerful opponents forced Progressives to
compromise their principles. As Henderson’s work showed, economic
regulatory agencies in particular adopted procedures strongly
122
resembling those of ordinary courts. Progressives understood that
agency hearings—whether to enforce regulations or to develop
investigative reports—had to ensure some degree of fairness, and
lawyers heading the agencies and serving on their staffs naturally took
the procedures of the ordinary courts as the starting point. Still,
principle demanded that agencies not be required to mirror the courts
exactly.
Representatives of the business community compromised as
well. The leading thinkers among them appreciated some of the
advantages of independent agencies. Experts might be more
responsive to their concerns than legislatures that could fall under the
sway of populist political forces. As Elihu Root put it at New York’s
constitutional convention in 1913, legislators offered “a multitude of
strike bills introduced for the purpose of holding up the corporations,
holding them up and calling them down,” to which corporations
responded by getting involved—and, as Root put it, creating “a
123
scandal and a disgrace”—in politics. Agency proceedings might
move more quickly to an acceptable conclusion than judicial ones.
Coming to terms with regulatory agencies meant accepting some
departures from the procedures used in the ordinary courts, but not
departures that were too substantial. Hewing closely to ordinary
courts’ procedures had the added advantage of giving the lawyers

121. For an overview of the early history of juvenile courts and its connection to
Progressivism, see generally VICTORIA GETIS, THE JUVENILE COURTS & THE PROGRESSIVES
(2000).
122. See HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 49–103 (outlining and analyzing the FTC’s
adjudication procedures).
123. 3 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 3102 (1916). “Strike bills” were bills aimed at placing corporations under economic
pressure in the way that labor strikes did. I thank Dan Ernst for this reference.
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who represented businesses in court the opportunity to extend their
124
representation to administrative agencies.
By the 1920s the law regarding administrative procedures had
stabilized. Although there was no “general” administrative law, but
merely statutes dealing with individual agencies or a general law
dealing with judicial review of executive action, lawyers understood
the patterns that had emerged. Administrative agencies could indeed
depart from traditional judicial procedures, and across a rather wide
125
range of matters courts would accept their decisions. In 1934, Justice
Cardozo wrote for a unanimous Court reversing a lower court
126
decision that had overturned an FTC ruling. Citing the statutory
provision that the FTC’s factual findings, “if supported by testimony,
shall be conclusive,” the Court chastised the lower court for giving
this provision “lip service only” by “picking and choosing for itself
127
among uncertain and conflicting inferences.” The reviewing court
should not become “an administrative body which is to try the case
128
129
anew.” This was, as Cardozo observed, well-established law. The
Supreme Court occasionally asserted that administrative decisions
were presumed to be correct, although of course such a presumption
130
was inevitably flexible. The open questions involved determining
the limits of departures from the conclusiveness of agency decisions.
The proliferation of agencies in the New Deal placed this
accommodation under substantial pressure. In part the pressure arose
from the fact that some aspects of agency decisionmaking did not
involve anything that could have been classified as scientific expertise
in traditional terms and, concomitantly, that some aspects of agency
decisionmaking were political in a straightforward sense. William
124. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA 52, 64–65 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (arguing that a segment of
the New York corporate bar expressly adopted a “corporatist” position within which this sort of
representation fit comfortably).
125. See, e.g., Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U.S. 258, 265 (1923) (reasoning
that deference to adjudications by customs officials “will leave the administration of the law
where the law intends it should be left; to the attention of officers made alert to attempts at
evasion of it and instructed by experience”).
126. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 82 (1934).
127. Id. at 73.
128. Id. at 77.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., FTC v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass’n, 273 U.S. 52, 63 (1927) (“The weight to
be given to the facts and circumstances admitted, as well as the inferences reasonably to be
drawn from them, is for the commission.”).
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Leiserson, appointed to the NLRB in 1939, was an experienced
131
arbitrator and mediator who surely believed that there was indeed a
132
science to resolving disputes between labor and management. But
the NLRB as a whole was a politicized body whose claims to
expertise were regularly belied by its decisions and by the evident
133
partiality of its staff, including the lawyers. The ICC, the object of
134
Sharfman’s and Frankfurter’s admiration, may have set the gold
standard for administrative agencies. Elite lawyers, including a
majority on the Supreme Court, understood that not every agency
measured up to that standard. Progressive claims about the inherent
fairness of decisions made by independent and expert agencies rang
hollow, or at least hollow enough to threaten to undo the
accommodations reached in prior decades. The Hughes Court
struggled to develop an administrative law that itself accommodated
the varied performance of the agencies it supervised.
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In: The St. Joseph Stock Yards Case
The first major dustup over the New Deal approach to
administrative law occurred in 1936, concurrent with what New
Dealers saw as the Court’s attack on the New Deal itself. The case, St.
135
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, involved an ordinary
ratemaking proceeding, and the issue before the Supreme Court was
136
the scope of judicial review of agency factfinding. Stockyards were a
137
crucial stop in meat’s journey from ranch to table. Cattlemen and
138
other ranchers shipped their stock by train to the stockyards. There,
“commission men” hired by the stockyard unloaded the stock from
the trains and drove the animals to pens, where they provided the
139
animals with food and water until the animals were sold. Stockyards
charged fees for these services. Indeed, because each city had no
131. EARL LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON: FROM THE NEW
DEAL TO MCCARTHY 140–41 (1966); see also National Affairs: Two Nice Men, TIME, May 8,
1939, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761206,00.html.
132. LATHAM, supra note 131, at 140–41.
133. For a discussion of investigations of Communist Party influence within the NLRB, see
id. at 124–50.
134. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 25; 3B SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 755 (1936).
135. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1935).
136. Id. at 45.
137. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515–16 (1922) (detailing the importance of
stockyards as “necessary factors in . . . this current of commerce”).
138. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 56–57.
139. Id.
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140

more than a few stockyards, the commission men were able to
141
charge monopoly prices for their services.
Responding to pressure from ranchers and shippers, Congress in
142
1921 enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act. Using language
drawn from the statute authorizing the ICC to set railroad rates, the
Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power to set maximum
143
rates for the services stockyards provided. Within the department,
the Secretary assigned the task of rate-setting to the Bureau of
Animal Industry, headed by a well-published veterinarian, John R.
144
Mohler, who led the Bureau from 1917 to 1943. According to
testimony given to a 1940 inquiry into how agencies actually
operated, the Bureau had a “live-and-let-live policy” toward the
commission men and generally acceded to their claims about the level
145
of rates needed to ensure profitability.
In 1929 R.W. Dunlap, the Acting Secretary pending the
confirmation of a permanent cabinet member, opened an inquiry into
the charges at the stockyard in St. Joseph, Missouri, which serviced
cattle and other animals for the Swift and Armour meatpacking
146
companies.
By February 1931, Arthur Hyde—confirmed as
Secretary of Agriculture shortly after Dunlap’s initial action—had not
reached a decision, and the stockyard operator petitioned to reopen
the hearing to take account of the changed circumstances occasioned
by the Great Depression. The Secretary denied the petition and, in
July 1931, lowered the rates previously charged by the stockyard. The
stockyard sued to bar the Secretary from enforcing the rate order,
arguing that he should have reopened the hearing. The three-judge
district court to which the case was assigned agreed. Hyde then

140. See Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514–15 (noting the problems of monopoly that animated
passage of the laws regulating stockyards).
141. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 68–69.
142. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 181–229c (2006)); see also Stafford, 258 U.S. at 513–16 (describing the conditions that led to
the enactment of the Packers and Stockyards Act).
143. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514 (noting that the Packers and Stockyards Act allows the
Secretary of Agriculture to “make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions, to fix rates,
or a minimum or maximum thereof”).
144. Daniel R. Ernst, Morgan and the New Dealers, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 448, 450 (2008).
145. Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings Before the Att’y Gen.’s Comm. on Admin.
Procedure 87 (June 28, 1940) (testimony of Thomas Cooke) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal)).
146. Transcript of Record at 2, St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. 38 (No. 497).
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conducted a new hearing starting in 1932. As a result of that
hearing, Rexford Tugwell, the Acting Secretary of Agriculture,
148
entered a new rate order in January 1934. In February, Henry
Wallace, the new Secretary of Agriculture, heard the stockyard’s
argument against the rates, but in May he confirmed the order. His
findings occupied more than one hundred pages in the record
149
Wallace ordered that the
submitted to the Supreme Court.
stockyard lower some of its rates—ones he found unreasonable and
150
discriminatory—while freezing others at their existing levels. He
allowed the stockyard to charge sixty cents above the market price for
151
hay, for example, rather than the sixty-five to seventy cents the
152
stockyard had been charging. Wallace’s decision may have been
motivated by his populist discomfort with agricultural middlemen, but
the Hoover administration’s agency had also pushed for a reduction
153
in the commission men’s rates.
After Wallace ordered the new, lower rates, the stockyard
operator again petitioned to reopen the hearing, this time citing the
changes the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural
154
Adjustment Act were about to bring to the industry. Wallace denied
the petition, and the stockyard again sought an injunction from the
155
district court. The company asserted that Wallace should have
reopened the hearing and that the rates he had set were
156
unconstitutionally confiscatory.
After a defeat in the district court, the stockyard appealed the
Secretary’s order to the Supreme Court. The company insisted that
the Secretary had misvalued many of the company’s assets—for
example, its land and a commercial hotel used by shippers and truck
drivers—and, as a result, had set the rates too low to generate the
ordinary rate of return that the Constitution required. The district
court had lamented that “heavily burdened courts [were] compelled

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. Ex. A, at 128.
Id. Ex. A, at 42.
For these details, see id. Ex. A, at 24–131.
Id. at 21; id. Ex. A, at 26–27.
Id. at 1, 5.
Id. at 15.
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157

to examine every separate matter.” That lament was supported by
the massive record in the case and, even more, by the briefs filed in
the company’s appeal. The abstract of the record ran to 1,648 printed
pages, with 1,358 additional pages of exhibits, maps, photographs, and
158
what Justice Brandeis later referred to as “reading matter.” The
company’s brief ran to 185 pages, with a separate appendix “prepared
159
in order that the brief itself may be kept within reasonable limits.”
The government’s brief, too, had an appendix, albeit a short one. But
160
the substantive brief ended on page 205.
The briefs’ bulk resulted from their canvassing of each
challenged finding of fact. Both sides saw the “scope of review”
question as key. The government did its best to minimize the issue,
although it preferred a standard under which the courts would uphold
161
agency findings of fact supported by “some evidence.”
The
summary of its argument said, “In view of the fact that the record
fully sustains the Secretary’s order on any theory of judicial review,
the question of the scope of judicial review is not material in this
162
case.” Only after almost two hundred pages devoted to the
163
valuation issues did the brief return to the scope-of-review issue.
The stockyard’s brief, in contrast, put the issue first and treated it
as dispositive. The discussion opened with an unannotated list of
nineteen cases that it asserted supported the view that courts should
exercise “independent judgment” about what the record
164
established. Then, analyzing the district court’s opinion, the brief
said that that court had gone “no further than to ascertain whether
there was some evidence to sustain the Secretary” and “did not even
weigh the evidence . . . to decide whether the Secretary’s evidence
165
sustained the conclusions stated.” The brief then quoted snippets

157. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 328 (W.D. Mo. 1935).
158. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 86 (1935) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
159. Brief for Appellant at 2, St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. 38 (No. 497).
160. Brief for the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture at 205, St. Joseph Stock
Yards, 298 U.S. 38 (No. 497).
161. Id. at 199–204.
162. Id. at 16.
163. See id. at 199 (beginning the government’s discussion of the scope-of-review issue).
164. Brief for Appellant, supra note 159, at 10–11, 14.
165. Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted).
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from each of the nineteen cases, an “unbroken line” adopting the
166
independent-judgment rule.
Justices Stone and Cardozo observed that the independentjudgment rule was fully supported by precedents that they believed
167
were mistaken. They would have “acquiesce[d]” in an opinion that
168
simply applied those precedents. But, they thought, Chief Justice
Hughes’s opinion for the Court tried to do more: “[t]he opinion
reexamines the foundations of the rule that it declares, and finds them
169
to be firm and true.” And indeed it did, but perhaps because
Hughes believed that the government was contending for an
extremely restrictive scope for judicial review of agency findings of
facts bearing on constitutional questions. The government’s proposed
170
test used language concerning compulsion. This suggested that the
government’s test was more like “some evidence to support the
agency’s findings” rather than “substantial evidence.” Hughes’s
opinion for the Court rehearsed the arguments for the independentjudgment test without framing the contrary position in terms of
171
“substantial evidence.”
For Hughes, the scope-of-review issue was directly connected to
the Constitution’s supremacy. Sounding a realistic note, he observed
that “agencies . . . work in a field peculiarly exposed to political
172
demands. Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient.”
Making agency findings “conclusive where constitutional rights of
liberty and property are involved . . . is to place those rights at the
173
mercy of administrative officials.” For Hughes, “That prospect, with
our multiplication of administrative agencies, is not one to be lightly
174
regarded.” Although Hughes did not spell it out, the connection

166. Id. at 18–22.
167. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 93 (1936) (Stone &
Cardozo, JJ., concurring) (“We think the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis states the law as it
ought to be, though we appreciate the weight of precedent that has now accumulated against
it.”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Brief for the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture, supra note 160, at 200–
01 (“[C]onstitutional rights are adequately protected if the reviewing court examines the
evidence for itself and determines that it does not compel arrival at different conclusions of fact
than those reached by the rate-making authority.”).
171. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 50–54.
172. Id. at 52.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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between these concerns and his references to “political demands” and
“subservient” agencies is clear: independent judgment on facts
bearing on constitutional rights was necessary to guard against the
possibility that a subservient agency would twist its factual findings in
response to political demands.
Yet this did not mean that courts should simply disregard what
the agency had done. The courts’ task “may be greatly facilitated”
and “informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert
175
legislative agency.” The courts were to look at the record as a
whole, there was a “strong presumption in favor of the conclusions
176
reached by an experienced administrative body after a full hearing,”
and the regulated entity had to make “a convincing showing” that
177
rates were so low as to amount to confiscation. Summarizing,
Hughes wrote that “findings made by a legislative agency after [a]
hearing will not be disturbed save as in particular instances they are
178
plainly shown to be overborne.”
After reaffirming the independent-judgment test with all the
qualifications, Hughes’s opinion turned to the valuation questions
and systematically affirmed the district court’s decisions on each
179
one. The discussion occupied nearly twenty pages in the U.S.
Reports, compared to the six devoted to the scope-of-review
question. The result was to uphold the district court’s decision that
180
the new rates did not violate the Constitution.
Justice Brandeis agreed with that outcome—as did Justices Stone
and Cardozo—but rejected the independent-judgment rule in favor of
181
a “substantial evidence” test. All that the Constitution required,
according to Brandeis, was a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal
that reached a conclusion supported by the evidence; it did not
require an inquiry “into the correctness of . . . findings of subsidiary
182
183
facts.” Citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, his own decision on de novo
review of the question of citizenship, Brandeis distinguished between
175. Id. at 53.
176. Id. (quoting Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 569 (1917)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 54.
179. Id. at 55–72.
180. Id. at 72.
181. Id. at 73 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“I think no good reason exists for making special
exception of issues of fact bearing upon a constitutional right.”).
182. Id. at 73–74.
183. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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“the right to liberty of person and other constitutional rights.”
Courts had to determine facts implicating the former, but Brandeis
devoted several pages to describing “a multitude of decisions [that]
tells us that when dealing with property a much more liberal rule
185
applies.”
Brandeis catalogued the grounds on which decisions could be
overturned on the basis of inadequate evidence. The formulations
ranged from a “lack of findings necessary to support” the decision to
186
a decision’s being “made without evidence.” Brandeis offered
another formulation: “whether there was evidence upon which
187
reasonable men could have found as the Secretary did.” These
standards resonated with the quite loose “no evidence” standard that
Hughes seemed to find in the government’s position. No “rigid rule”
governed; rather, the Court “ha[d] followed the rule of reason” and
“ha[d] weighed the relative value of constitutional rights, the
188
essentials of powers conferred, and the need of protecting both.”
Brandeis had to face up to seemingly adverse precedents, but in the
end he reverted to fundamentals. “The supremacy of law demands
that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an
erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in
189
which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly.”
Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1938, Ralph Fuchs saw in St.
Joseph Stock Yards a “quite clear[] . . . distrust of administrative
190
agencies and a belief in the superiority of the courts,” and he
191
Echoing
connected that decision to the Diceyan tradition.
Brandeis’s observation that the Supreme Court “has recognized that
there is a limit to the capacity of judges, and [that] the magnitude of
the task imposed upon them . . . may prevent prompt and faithful
192
performance,” Robert Cooper in the same issue described Crowell
193
v. Benson as resting on a “presumption of judicial infallibility”

184. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 77 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Ng Fung Ho,
259 U.S. at 282–85).
185. Id. at 77–82.
186. Id. at 74.
187. Id. at 83.
188. Id. at 81–82.
189. Id. at 84.
190. Fuchs, supra note 36, at 565.
191. Id. at 557–59.
192. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 81 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
193. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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194

These were clear
about finding “facts in the absolute.”
overstatements. The practical distance between Hughes’s position
and Brandeis’s was quite small, although the ideological and
195
methodological distance may have been larger.
Hughes rejected the most extreme position he thought the
government might be taking: that agency findings of fact had to be
accepted by the courts if those findings were supported by any
196
evidence at all. In form, he rejected the proposition that such
findings had to be accepted if they were supported by substantial
evidence. Yet he followed his rejection of that proposition with
statement after statement indicating that courts would be well advised
197
to give substantial weight to the agencies’ findings. And, notably,
the entire controversy involved only findings of fact bearing on the
question of whether the agency action violated the Constitution. That
the substantial-evidence test applied to other agency findings was
198
accepted by all.
Hughes’s analysis in St. Joseph Stock Yards looked backward to a
legal world in which, as Brandeis put it, “rigid rules” governed in an
on-or-off fashion: independent judgment on facts bearing on
199
constitutional violations, some evidence for other facts. Brandeis’s
was a typically nonformalist, legal-realist approach in which interests
were to be balanced. But Hughes’s opinion had its realistic elements
as well. Even the Progressive theorists of administrative law
understood that what Hughes described as the “multiplication of
administrative agencies” undermined the Progressive claim that all
200
agencies were equally expert. Brandeis envisioned a world in which
administrative agencies were professional and expert, and relied on a
194. Cooper, supra note 36, at 593–94.
195. Brandeis was disturbed that rates the Secretary had determined to be excessive had
been in effect for more than six years after Dunlap began the inquiry and for more than two
years after Wallace’s decision, and Brandeis cited a number of other cases in which review of
ratemaking had taken years. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 88–92 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). After the Court’s clarification of the proper standard of review, though, delays
could be expected to diminish.
196. Id. at 50–53 (majority opinion).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 51; id. at 73 (Brandeis, J., concurring); id. at 93–94 (Stone & Cardozo, JJ.,
concurring); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 230 (1938) (holding
the National Labor Relations Act’s directive that NLRB findings were conclusive “if supported
by evidence” to require “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might adopt as adequate
to support a conclusion”).
199. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 50–53.
200. Id. at 52.
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seemingly infallible judiciary to take variations in expertise and
ability into account when balancing interests. Hughes explicitly
recognized imperfections in agencies, and his formalism implicitly
recognized the difficulty imperfect judges would have in accurately
determining which agencies deserved greater deference, which less.
Imperfect courts exercising independent judgment in all cases might
produce a better accommodation of competing interests than
imperfect courts attempting to balance the interests directly.
Under Hughes’s approach, the courts nominally exercised
independent judgment. Giving “weight” to an agency’s findings is not
the same as treating those findings as conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence, but the difference is not large. Cooper thought
that the “mental gymnastics” required by Hughes’s formulations were
201
“beyond the capacity of even the greatest human intellect.” If so,
the decision would be a victory in practice for the Progressive
conception of administrative law: agency actions would be routinely
upheld because courts could not perform the “mental gymnastics”
required to distinguish between constitutional and ordinary facts and
between “some evidence” and “substantial evidence.” For Hughes,
though, leaving the decision in the courts’ hands—no matter how
little that might matter in any case—preserved what was left of the
Diceyan tradition in U.S. administrative law. Once again, Hughes
looked backward and forward at the same time.
C. The SEC as a “Star Chamber”?
A week after the oral arguments in St. Joseph Stock Yards, the
Court heard J. Edward Jones’s challenge to efforts by the SEC to
investigate his practices as a dealer in oil royalties. Jones was the
flamboyant chair of the National Petroleum Council, which purported
to represent independent oil producers, and a fervent opponent of
202
government regulation of his business practices. He offered his
clients rights to participate in the distribution of royalties from oil
fields; the SEC believed that he inflated the likely returns from the
royalties and sometimes used earnings from other securities to pay off
the oil royalties in something like a Ponzi scheme. The record in
203
Jones v. SEC was thinner than that in St. Joseph Stock Yards, and
Justice Sutherland was able to produce an opinion more quickly than
201. Cooper, supra note 36, at 598.
202. SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1935, at 36.
203. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Hughes. Announced on April 6, 1936—after the Supreme Court had
204
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act in January and heard
arguments regarding the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in
205
March —the decision in Jones avoided deciding whether Congress
had the power to regulate the issuance of securities and found instead
206
that the Commission’s procedures had violated Jones’s rights.
Sutherland’s opinion contributed to the inflamed atmosphere
207
surrounding the Court in 1936.
208
Throughout 1935, lawsuits were buzzing around Jones’s head.
The reason, he said, was that Harold Ickes, who as Secretary of the
Interior supervised oil production, was out to get him because of
Jones’s adamant opposition to what he called Ickes’s attempt to give
“dictatorship powers to him[self] for the absolute control of the
209
petroleum industry.” Jones saw himself as the representative of the
small, ruggedly individualistic, independent oil producers standing up
against major oil companies’ efforts to mobilize the government to
crush them under the guise of eliminating sharp business practices
210
and overproduction. Jones quoted an unnamed source who had told
him that Ickes wanted the SEC “to ‘turn on the heat’ in my personal
direction,” and that Ickes had said, “I will put J. Edward Jones in cold

204. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated by United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
205. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991, invalidated by Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
206. Jones, 298 U.S. at 21–22.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 268–75.
208. The oddest lawsuit was a criminal prosecution brought by the federal government
against William Rabell, who had been employed as an accountant and investigator for the SEC.
The government charged Rabell with soliciting a bribe from Jones. Jones Bribe Case Called Plot
on SEC, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1935, at 3. Jones testified that Rabell came to his house in
Scarsdale, New York, in June 1935 and offered to testify favorably to Jones at an SEC hearing
in exchange for $27,500, of which, the government said, he received $250. Rabell Bribe Case
Dismissed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1936, at 10. Jones was cooperating with the local U.S.
Attorney’s office in an effort, Rabell’s lawyer argued, to “ruin” the SEC, and, again according
to Rabell’s lawyer, Jones’s attorney “had acted as ‘stage manager’” for the prosecutors, who had
planted recording devices at Jones’s house. Jones Bribe Case Called Plot on SEC, supra. The
episode was bizarre enough that the first jury to hear the case could not arrive at a verdict. After
testimony closed at a retrial, the judge dismissed the case against Rabell on the ground that the
SEC had never had any intention of using him as a witness, so that whatever Jones gave him
could not have been a bribe, although it might have been extortion. Rabell Bribe Case
Dismissed by Judge, supra.
209. SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, supra note 202.
210. J. EDWARD JONES, AND SO—THEY INDICTED ME! 26–28 (1938).
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storage and keep him there till the next Ice Age.” Jones, for his
part, told an associate that he “wanted to ruin . . . [SEC] Chairman
212
[Joseph] Kennedy.”
As a result of a five-week investigation of Jones’s operations, the
SEC in February 1935 obtained an injunction against Jones and his
213
associates. According to the SEC, the investigation had disclosed
that Jones was paying what he called dividends on oil royalties that
were in fact the proceeds of sales of other securities, and that “Jones’s
214
profit in many instances approximated 700 per cent.” “[A]s a
tactical move,” Jones said, he consented to the temporary injunction
215
even though he denied the SEC’s allegations. He intended to
challenge the constitutionality of the Securities Exchange Act when
216
the SEC sought a permanent injunction.
Before that happened, though, Jones filed a registration
statement in May for a new offering of rights to participate in the
distribution of oil royalties. This eventually became the vehicle for
Jones’s attack on the SEC’s constitutionality. The SEC told Jones
that it proposed to direct him to stop offering the rights, saying that
his registration statement appeared to contain untrue statements and
to omit other facts that investors would find important. Under the
Securities Exchange Act, the registration would become effective on
May 24. On May 23, the SEC sent Jones a telegram saying that it
would hold a hearing on the statements on June 6, later postponed
until June 18. On June 13, the SEC issued a subpoena directing that
Jones appear with his business records. Jones refused to comply with
the subpoena. Instead, on the new hearing date, he had his attorney
seek to withdraw the registration statement. William Green, the
hearing officer, refused the request, relying on an agency rule saying
that the agency had discretion to refuse to allow registrants to
217
withdraw their filings. Otherwise, the SEC’s lawyer told Green,
sellers like Jones could “go right up under the gun of a stop order”
218
and then withdraw the offering.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, supra note 202.
Jones Is Witness at Trial of Rabell, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1935, at 8.
J.E. Jones Enjoined in Oil Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1935, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Fails to Answer Subpoena by SEC, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1935, at 29.
Id.
Id.
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When Jones evaded another subpoena, the SEC went to court
for an order directing Jones to appear. Jones appealed the trial
court’s decision granting that order, and the court of appeals affirmed
the order. Judge Martin Manton’s opinion dismissed Jones’s
constitutional arguments, finding that Congress could use its power to
219
regulate the mails to make it unlawful to sell unregistered securities.
Jones supplemented his regular lawyers for his appeal to the Supreme
Court. He hired Bainbridge Colby, a New York lawyer who had been
Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, and James M. Beck, an
archconservative who had been Solicitor General in the Harding
administration before winning a seat in the House of
220
Representatives.
Beck and Colby devoted most of their argument to attacking the
221
SEC’s constitutionality, leaving to the final pages of their brief the
argument that the SEC had to allow Jones to withdraw his
registration statement and so had no power to subpoena him after
222
that. On the SEC’s denial of the statement’s withdrawal, Jones’s
lawyers told the Supreme Court that the SEC was on a “fishing
expedition,” which Jones undoubtedly saw as a continuation of its
223
Javert-like pursuit of an innocent man. Beck made what turned out
to be a crucial point about the refusal of withdrawal: publicity about a
pending SEC action would inevitably make it difficult for even “the
great house of J.P. Morgan” to issue stock, because SEC action, even
at a preliminary stage, would suggest that the issuer could not be
224
trusted. The government’s brief, signed by Stanley Reed and written

219. Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1935).
220. Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 640); William F. Swindler,
Constitutional Retrospect: The First Series of Cutler Lectures Revisited, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 2 (1981) (“James M. Beck of Pennsylvania . . . . had been Solicitor General of the United
States under President Harding and by 1935 would be a vigorous critic of the New Deal.”); G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1, 77 (1999) (referring to “Bainbridge Colby, the last Secretary of State to serve in the
Wilson administration”).
221. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 220, at 9–56. The heart of the constitutional argument
was the seemingly peculiar point that the registration requirement did nothing to prevent fraud
because a completely fake security could be offered through the mails as long as the registration
statement made it clear that the security was indeed a fake. Id. at 9; Securities Act Held
Violation of State Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1936, at 5.
222. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 220, at 57–71.
223. Id. at 58; Securities Act Held Violation of State Rights, supra note 221.
224. See SEC Rights Argued in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1936, at 1. Apparently
Justices Butler and McReynolds were particularly exercised about the way in which the SEC
had publicized its rule on withdrawing registration statements, in the mistaken belief that the
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with the assistance of the SEC’s chief counsel John Burns and
Department of Justice attorneys Charles Horsky and Alger Hiss, was
a bit more balanced, but it, too, focused on the constitutional
225
question.
The Supreme Court did not. After the oral argument, Landis
wrote Frankfurter that “[t]he only possibility of defeat is on a
procedural point,” which turned out to be accurate, and that he could
not “see a sane bench of judges not giving us some freedom in
226
working out our procedural technique,” which was not. A sixJustice majority held that Jones had an absolute right to withdraw his
227
registration statement before it became effective. Justice Sutherland
228
noted that the statute had no provision dealing with withdrawal.
Without guidance from the statute or indeed from any other statutes
dealing with agency power, Sutherland turned to judicial practice.
The settled rule, he said, was that plaintiffs had an “unqualified right”
229
to dismiss a complaint unless doing so would harm the defendant.
The SEC’s regulation, which said that the Commission “shall” give
consent to a dismissal “with due regard to the public interest and the
protection of investors,” was, to Sutherland, the same as the judicial
230
rule. And he found nothing in the record to indicate what prejudice
could result from withdrawing a registration statement before the
SEC had acted: “an abandonment of the application was of no
231
concern to anyone except” Jones.
Sutherland went on to offer an “additional reason” for giving
232
registrants an absolute right to withdraw. The SEC’s notice to Jones
rule, which was first announced in a press release, had not been more formally placed in the
official register of agency actions. See id. (“[Jones’s attorney] asserted that nowhere in the
Securities Act[ of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006),] did Congress deny the right to
withdraw a registration statement, and added that the basis of this compulsion came through a
commission regulation, of which notice was given only in a release to the newspapers. Justices
Butler and McReynolds . . . seemed impressed with the ‘lack of publication’ of this ruling.”);
Securities Act Held Violation of State Rights, supra note 221 (“Later it was developed that now
all of the commission’s rules are published in the Federal Register.”).
225. See Brief for the Respondent, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 640).
226. Letter from James Landis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 11, 1936) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library).
227. Jones, 298 U.S. at 21–22.
228. Id. at 19.
229. Id. at 21–22.
230. Id. at 22.
231. Id. at 23 (“The possibility of any other interest in the matter is so shadowy, indefinite,
and equivocal that it must be put out of consideration as altogether unreal.”).
232. Id.
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informed him that the agency had questions about the registration
statement, and “invited” him to explain why the registration should
233
not be suspended. But, “[i]n the face of such an invitation, it is a
strange conclusion that the registrant is powerless to elect to save
himself the trouble and expense of a contest by withdrawing his
application,” which “accomplishes everything which a stop order
234
would accomplish.” All this was largely unexceptionable.
And then the rhetoric escalated dramatically. As Sutherland
wrote,
The action of the commission finds no support in right principle or
in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. . . . [T]o the precise
extent that the mere will of an official or an official body is
permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to
supplant the standing law as a rule of human conduct, the
235
government ceases to be one of laws and becomes an autocracy.

“Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution,” he continued,
236
“cannot both exist.” Accepting the Progressive account of modern
government, Sutherland described agencies as “necessarily called . . .
into existence by the increasing complexities of our modern business
and political affairs,” and said that they could not be “permitted
gradually to extend their powers by encroachments—even petty
encroachments—upon the fundamental rights, privileges, and
237
immunities of the people.” Otherwise, “we shall in the end, while
avoiding the fatal consequences of a supreme autocracy, become
submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of personal rights, less
238
destructive but no less violative of constitutional guaranties.”
The SEC tried to defend its refusal to allow the withdrawal by
asserting that the submission of the registration statement triggered a
general authority to investigate Jones’s business activities. Sutherland
disagreed. The only point to the SEC’s inquiry was to examine the
registration statement. Once Jones withdrew it, the SEC had not
identified any other reason for an investigation. Sutherland cited
earlier statements condemning “fishing expedition[s],” and quoted a
well-known lower court opinion harshly describing such inquiries as
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

1608

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1565

“intolerable tyranny”: they were “general, roving, offensive,
inquisitional, [and] compulsory, . . . without any allegations, upon no
239
fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law.” To Sutherland,
“An investigation not based upon specified grounds is . . . as
objectionable as a search warrant not based upon specific statements
240
of fact.”
Further, “[t]he fear that some malefactor may go
unwhipped of justice weighs as nothing against this just and strong
241
condemnation of a practice so odious.” After all, Sutherland
observed, there were other ways of investigating Jones’s practices—a
242
criminal investigation and grand jury indictment.
Sutherland’s position had some merit. He went too far, though,
in linking the SEC’s inquiry to the “intolerable abuses of the Star
Chamber,” and insisting that “[e]ven the shortest step in the direction
of curtailing” the right against “unlawful inquisitorial
investigations . . . . must be halted in limine lest it serve as a precedent
243
for further advances in the same direction.” Somehow Sutherland
discerned in the government’s position the “philosophy that
constitutional limitations and legal restraints upon official action may
244
be brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance, may follow.”
Exactly what all this had to do with the Jones case itself remained
quite unclear. Perhaps in his own eyes Jones was pure as the driven
245
snow, but the 1935 injunction against him suggested otherwise. It
was not obviously arbitrary for the SEC to exercise an informed
discretion to inquire into the honesty of his most recent effort to sell
securities. Frankfurter’s and Stone’s comments on the opinion seem
apt. As Frankfurter wrote to Stone, “Sutherland writes as though he
were still a United States Senator, making a partisan speech.” To this,
Stone replied that Jones “was written for morons, and such will no
246
doubt take comfort from it.” In another letter to Frankfurter, Stone
described the opinion as full of “platitudinous irrelevancies,”
239. Id. at 26 (quoting Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 445 (1915)); id. at 27 (quoting In re Pac.
Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 263 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)).
240. Id. at 27.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 27–28.
243. Id. at 28.
244. Id. at 27.
245. Jones’s strategic decision not to contest the injunction weakened any inferences that
could be drawn from that episode.
246. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Apr. 7, 1936) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library); Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Felix
Frankfurter (Apr. 7, 1936) (on file with the Harvard Law School Special Collections Library).

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

1609

“set[ting] at naught a plain command of Congress, without the
247
invocation of any identifiable prohibition of the Constitution.”
Justice Cardozo wrote a brief dissent, in which Brandeis and
Stone joined. He acknowledged that Sutherland’s reminders “of the
dangers that wait upon the abuse of power by officialdom unchained”
248
were “so fraught with truth that [they] can never be untimely.” But,
he continued, “[T]imely too is the reminder, as a host of
impoverished investors will be ready to attest, that there are dangers
in untruths and half truths when certificates masquerading as
249
securities pass current in the market.” Evoking Brandeis’s favorite
dictum that sunlight is the best disinfectant, Cardozo said that such
250
wrongs “must be dragged to light and pilloried.” Sutherland’s
analogy to the Star Chamber and similar practices were, Cardozo
251
wrote, “strange.” The “denunciatory fervor” with which the analogy
was made led to the understated observation that “[h]istorians may
252
find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile.”
Turning from the rhetoric in and philosophy animating
Sutherland’s opinion, Cardozo constructed a straightforward legal
argument against Jones. Cardozo found the SEC rule allowing
withdrawal of registration statements only with the SEC’s consent to
253
be valid. With that as a predicate, the continuing inquiry into
254
Jones’s practices was not “a roving examination.” The rule made
sense because “[r]ecklessness and deceit do not automatically excuse
255
themselves by notice of repentance”: even a withdrawn registration
statement might support civil or criminal liability. Congress wanted to
make sure that “retribution for the past is added to prevention for the
future” by giving “overlap[ping]” authority to the SEC and the
Department of Justice and by providing for immunity from criminal
256
prosecution for statements made under compulsion to the SEC.
247. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 9, 1936) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library).
248. Jones, 298 U.S. at 32 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 33. Cardozo observed that, unlike the Court of Star Chamber, the SEC lacked the
power to imprison or punish for contempt, and its regulatory actions were subject to judicial
review. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 29.
255. Id. at 30.
256. Id. at 30–31.
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Cardozo ended his opinion, “The Rule now assailed was wisely
conceived and lawfully adopted to foil the plans of knaves intent
257
upon obscuring or suppressing the knowledge of their knavery.”
Jones was of a piece with St. Joseph Stock Yards. The majorities
in both cases were to some degree skeptical about the fairness of
proceedings before some administrative agencies. In both cases, the
majority sought refuge in general and formalistic rules that would
constrain imperfect agencies. In both, the majority accepted the fact
that the rules would also interfere with the smooth operation of wellfunctioning agencies. That was the import of Hughes’s reference to
258
“subservient” agencies
and of Sutherland’s insistence that
incursions on rights had to be stopped at their seemingly mild onset.
The dissents in both cases were confident that courts could “[stick]
259
close to the practicalities of government as revealed by history,” and
that they could accurately apply “pragmatic test[s] of workability in
260
an imperfect world.” Their confidence in the courts led them to
place a lower value than the majority on the possibility (or, as the
majorities would have said, the fact) that some agencies would
sometimes go off the rails.
SEC chair James Landis issued a statement saying that the Jones
decision “would put some difficulties in the way of labeling fraudulent
promoters as such,” but that the Commission’s work would go on
because most of the agency’s investigations involved registrations that
261
had taken effect. A story in the Wall Street Journal observed that
the decision left some uncertainty about the SEC’s power because it
indicated that the agency could investigate after a registration became
“effective” without defining what the effective date of a registration
262
was. It suggested that aggressive lawyers for securities issuers could
take advantage of the Court’s condemnation of “fishing expeditions”
to challenge investigations undertaken pursuant to statutory

257. Id. at 33.
258. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936).
259. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE L.J. 458, 477–78
(1939).
260. Dean G. Acheson, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Problems of Government, 37 MICH. L.
REV. 513, 524 (1939). That article and Frankfurter, supra note 259, are tributes to Cardozo
occasioned by his death.
261. Landis to Keep Up Fight on Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1936, at 18.
262. Supreme Court Decree Creates Uncertainty over SEC Powers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
1936, at 5.
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provisions mentioned but not involved in the Jones decision.
Reflecting Wall Street’s general satisfaction with the disclosure
regime administered by the SEC, editorialists at the same paper were
264
as little disturbed as Landis. The decision left “[n]o [c]asualties,” as
265
their editorial was titled.
Nothing in the decision “seriously
impair[ed] the usefulness” of the SEC, because the decision, “[a]t
most, admonishe[d] SEC that it [did] not possess a specific power . . . .
No part of the very great amount of excellent work the SEC ha[d]
done was based upon” its power to continue an investigation after a
266
registration statement had been withdrawn, the editorial argued. It
reassured its readers that “[p]ublic security offerings remain[ed] as
267
fully subject to the Commission’s scrutiny as ever.”
Newspaper commentators on the Court’s work saw in the
decision “the characteristic cleavage of opinion between the members
of the [C]ourt on problems arising out of the relation of government
268
to the individual.” Dean Dinwoodie, writing in the New York
Times, focused on the “uncompromising tone” used by Sutherland
269
Sutherland’s “warning” was “seemingly not
and Cardozo.
270
demanded by the particular case at hand.” Arthur Krock’s regular
271
column on politics was more critical. Sutherland and his colleagues
“[were] determined to let no occasion pass, no word go unsaid, to
check any possibility of invasion, by bureau or commission, of what
they consider[ed] the constitutional reservations of Congress and the
courts,” whereas Cardozo and his colleagues “obviously consider[ed]
that the majority [was] overzealous and even imaginative in
272
discovering these invasions.” Sutherland “spared” no “space and
diction . . . in the writing of resounding passages about the guarantees
and reservations of the Constitution,” whereas Cardozo “suggested
with none too faint irony that this majority prose booms louder than

263. Id.
264. No Casualties, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1936, at 6.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Dean Dinwoodie, SEC Case Revives Old Court Division, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1936, at
E7.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Arthur Krock, Supreme Court Once Again Splits on Fundamentals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1936, at 24.
272. Id.

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

1612

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1565

273

is necessary.” The lay reader, represented by Krock himself, saw the
Justices “debating political philosophy, having in mind the general
methods and tendencies of the New Deal. Mr. Jones and his struggle
274
with the SEC were but incidents in the argument.” For the
Washington Post, Sutherland’s “castigat[ion]” of the SEC was
particularly ironic because, “of all the New Deal eggs that were
spawned, the SEC, with James M. Landis as its present head, ha[d]
been acclaimed on all sides for its sensible caution in administering
275
the law.”
Having returned to Harvard Law School as dean after serving as
chair of the SEC, Landis had a unique and personal perspective on
the case. In his Storrs Lectures two years after the Jones decision
Landis quoted Sutherland’s reference to the Star Chamber.
Reflecting a bit of the outrage that Frankfurter had expressed, he said
that this “outburst indicates that one is in a field where calm judicial
276
temper has fled.” The Court’s approach, Landis suggested, would
have “the effect, if not the purpose,” of “breed[ing] distrust of the
277
administrative.” Still, Landis remained calm, perhaps to contrast his
rhetoric with Sutherland’s. He suggested that the courts were
defensive because they understood that agencies had proliferated
because of the courts’ “inadequacies.” He further noted that the
Supreme Court’s important cases were all divided, and that the
dissenters were likely to prevail in the long run: “[b]ecause their
reasoning seem[ed] more to accord with the temper of the times, it
[was] they, rather than the majority, who [were] likely to gain
278
adherents to their position.”
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Justices Cracked Down on SEC, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1936, at B2. That article also
referred to the “well-known” split between liberals and conservatives. Id.
276. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 139.
277. Id. at 140.
278. Id. at 141. The Roosevelt administration took up Sutherland’s suggestion that the
proper course of action was a criminal prosecution. The Department of Justice immediately
convened a grand jury to investigate Jones’s activities, and a month after the Court rebuffed the
SEC, the Department of Justice indicted Jones on fifteen counts of mail fraud, citing statements
he had made that his oil royalty investments were “scientifically appraised” and “profitable
investments,” and alleging that he had skimmed profits off of the trusts. J.E. Jones Indicted on
15 Fraud Counts, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1936, at 10. Unfazed, Jones described the prosecution as
“mad persecution advanced to the most pitiable stages of New Dealirium.” Id. He “warn[ed]
against the dangers of vicious governmental malevolence bent on riding roughshod over
individual rights” and denounced the government’s “continual hounding” of him. Id. The case
came to trial a year later, with Jones represented by the noted trial lawyer Lloyd Stryker. After
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D. The Morgan Cases
The Jones case attracted a fair amount of attention in the
279
newspapers, perhaps because of Jones’s colorful personality. The
New Deal’s next confrontation with the Supreme Court over
administrative law made the front pages because Henry Wallace
believed that the Court had impugned his character in reversing a
rate decision he personally had made.
The episode, which ended up generating five Supreme Court
opinions, began—as had the St. Joseph Stock Yards case—with an
inquiry, following the market collapses of the 1920s, into the rates
280
charged by commission men at Kansas City stockyards. After two
years of examination, the Hoover administration’s Secretary of
Agriculture entered an order in May 1932 that reduced the rates by
281
about 10 percent. The commission men asked that the hearing be
reopened “in view of changed economic conditions,” and new
282
testimony was developed from July through November 1932. The
matter had reached the Secretary of Agriculture’s office when the
new administration came in. Wallace believed that there were too
many commission men and agencies, with “too much competition in
283
the business.” His basic theory was that sales agencies incurred
fixed costs that did not vary with the amount of business, and that
“too much competition” meant that rates had to cover too many of
284
these fixed costs. Wallace reduced the rates even further to reflect
what he believed were more reasonable salaries for a more
285
reasonable number of commission men.
hearing testimony for about a month, the jury acquitted Jones, deliberating for less than four
hours. Jones Is Acquitted in Mail Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1937, at 7. Not one to give up
after winning, Jones then self-published a book, And So—They Indicted Me!, JONES, supra note
210, and unsuccessfully sued Joseph Kennedy and James Landis for $1 million for the damage
they had done, he said, to his reputation. Court Rejects Suit of J.E. Jones v. SEC, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1939, at 24. He remained in the oil business, out of the public eye, until 1947 when he
resurfaced by signing a contract with the Mexican government to drill one hundred wells there.
Oil: Foot in the Door, TIME, Sept. 22, 1947, at 88, 88–89.
279. See supra notes 261–75 and accompanying text.
280. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 471 (1936).
281. United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 199 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting); Morgan, 298
U.S. at 471–72.
282. Morgan, 298 U.S. at 472.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 473.
285. Id. A report in 1938 quoted an estimate that the fee reduction was 12.61 percent.
Chesly Manly, Court Rebukes Wallace; Voids His Rate Order, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 26, 1938,
at 21, 23.
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The commission men appealed to a special three-judge court and
then to the Supreme Court. They hired a heavy hitter to represent
them: Frederick H. Wood of New York, a staunch opponent of the
New Deal who had successfully argued A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
286
287
Corp. v. United States and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the latter just
six weeks before he appeared in the Supreme Court again to present
288
the argument for the commission men.
The commission men were most concerned about the rates, but
they added a procedural challenge to their appeal. The Packers and
Stockyards Act required that the Secretary of Agriculture give the
289
middlemen a “full hearing,” and the commission men alleged that
they had not had a full hearing. They identified what they regarded as
three key deficiencies in the procedures. First, they had asked the
hearing examiner in the 1932 proceedings to “prepare a tentative
report” to which they could respond with an oral argument in front of
290
the Secretary of Agriculture. But no such report was prepared.
Second, they objected to the fact that the evidence had been
presented to R.W. Dunlap and Rexford Tugwell as Acting Secretaries
of Agriculture, whereas the statute required that only the Secretary
291
could set rates. And, finally, industry gossip led them to allege that
Wallace “had not personally heard or read any of the evidence
presented,” nor had he read the briefs prepared by the middlemen or
heard any oral arguments from them, but that he had instead relied
entirely on “consultation with employees in the Department of
292
Agriculture out of the presence” of the commission men’s lawyers.
293
The lower court held that these allegations were irrelevant. The
implication of this holding was that even if everything the commission
men said was true, they had still had the “full hearing” the statute
required.
286. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
287. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
288. Morgan, 298 U.S. at 468.
289. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, §§ 309–310, 42 Stat. 159, 165–67 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 210–211 (2006)).
290. Morgan, 298 U.S. at 475.
291. Id. at 482 n.1.
292. Id. at 476.
293. See Morgan v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 766, 768 (W.D. Mo. 1934) (“We think it is
unnecessary now to elaborate the obvious observation that the theory of these allegations is
supported by nothing in the act and that a construction of the act consistent with that theory
would destroy it altogether as a measure capable of practical administration.”), rev’d, 298 U.S.
468 (1936).
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The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the lower
court’s ruling on the “full hearing” question. Chief Justice Hughes’s
294
opinion set aside some of the commission men’s objections. Acting
Secretaries heard the commission men’s objections to the proposed
rates, but Tugwell had left the final decision to Wallace. Noting in
passing that Wallace could have delegated the authority to set rates to
his subordinates, although he had not done so here, Hughes endorsed
administrative freedom to organize bureaucracies in ways that
295
administrators found to be most effective.
The heart of the problem, though, was that, according to the
allegations, Wallace had set the rates “without having heard or read
any of the evidence” or even any of the briefs prepared by the
commission men’s lawyers, relying entirely on informal
296
“consultations” with department employees. If those allegations
were true, Hughes wrote, the commission men would not have had
the “full hearing” the statute required. Hughes distinguished between
“ordinary administration” and ratemaking, although the precise
distinction was obscure, seemingly having something to do with the
special requirements Congress had placed on ratemaking
297
proceedings.
When Congress had “requir[ed] the taking and
weighing of evidence, [and] determinations of fact based upon the
consideration of the evidence,” the proceedings were “quasi-judicial,”
and brought into play “the tradition of judicial proceedings” in which
“the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to consider
the evidence.” Hughes continued that “[t]he ‘hearing’ [was] the
hearing of evidence and argument. If the one who determine[d] the
facts which underl[ay] the order ha[d] not considered evidence or
298
argument, it [was] manifest that the hearing ha[d] not been given.”
The government contended that the statute’s requirement was
satisfied if “the Department of Agriculture,” considered as a single
entity without looking inside it to see who actually did what, set the

294. According to Hughes, the commission men could have had the statutory full hearing
even if the hearing examiner had not prepared a report and let the parties see it before the
Secretary decided. That would have been “good practice” and had been “found to be of great
value” in ICC proceedings, but it was not “essential to the validity of the hearing.” Morgan, 298
U.S. at 478.
295. Id. at 478–79.
296. Id. at 478.
297. Id. at 479.
298. Id. at 480–81.
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rates, and that courts could set aside rates unsupported by evidence.
The problem, Hughes saw, was that courts deferred to agency
factfinding because they assumed “that the officer who makes the
300
findings has addressed himself to the evidence.” The government’s
“Department as a whole” theory, Hughes wrote, would allow one
official to hear and consider the evidence and make findings and
another official to set those findings aside “for reasons of policy”
301
without considering “either evidence or argument.”
Because
decisionmakers could use “assistants” to “sift[] and analyze[]” the
evidence, and because arguments could be oral or written, requiring
the decisionmaker to hear and consider evidence would not burden
302
the administrative state.
What mattered was substance, and
substance required that “the officer who makes the determinations
303
must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
Hughes concluded tersely, “The one who decides must hear.” The
case was remanded to the lower court to find out whether the
304
allegations about Wallace’s decisionmaking process were true.
Consistent with Hughes’s views about the modest effects of the
ruling on the operation of a modern bureaucracy, Wallace and other
New Dealers took the decision in stride. They believed that what they
had done was entirely consistent with what Hughes has described as
an adequate “full hearing.” They were outraged, though, when
Hughes offered what major newspapers called a “rebuke” to Wallace
305
when the case returned to the Court two years later.
The problem began when the lawyers for the commission men
investigated how Wallace had actually gone about making his
decision. They submitted forty-six interrogatories to Wallace, who
seemed to be exercised as much by the number as by the content of
306
the questions. Although Wallace found it difficult to retrieve
299. Id. at 481.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 481–82.
304. Id. at 482.
305. See Court Rebuke His Own Fault, Aide to Hoover Tells Wallace, WASH. POST, May 24,
1938, at X2; High Court Rebuke to Wallace Sharp, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1938, at 2; Manly, supra
note 285; see also Court Warns U.S. Agencies to Play Fair, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1938, at X1
(noting that Chief Justice Hughes “judicially rebuked Wallace”); Supreme Court Voids Wallace
Order Fixing Stockyard Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1938, at 5 (“The Supreme Court sharply
rebuked Secretary of Agriculture Wallace . . . .”); infra text accompanying notes 340–41.
306. Ernst, supra note 144, at 453.
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detailed memories of events that had taken place more than three
years before, his answers, prepared in consultation with his lawyer,
Solicitor General Robert Jackson, showed that Wallace had
307
personally evaluated the evidence and made the decision. The one
who decided had indeed heard.
The answers, though, also revealed the catch-as-catch-can
process of decisionmaking in the early days of the New Deal—and,
perhaps, within any complex bureaucracy. Staff members, lawyers,
and supervisors wandered the halls, had occasional conversations,
dropped into offices to discuss aspects of the record, and produced
308
documents that worked their way into Wallace’s hands. The staff
lawyer in charge of the case for the Department of Agriculture
compiled a set of proposed findings of fact and delivered them to
309
Wallace, who said that he would read them at home. Over the next
two weeks, Wallace argued with Mohler about the level at which the
rates should be set, with Mohler taking the commission men’s side. In
the end Wallace concluded that there were too many agencies in
Kansas City and that the number could be reduced if the rates they
310
were allowed to charge were reduced. The strongly anti–New Deal
Chicago Daily Tribune, sympathetic to the commission men, gave a
political spin to Wallace’s decision: “As there are only a few dozen
commission men in Kansas City as against tens of thousands of
farmers who send livestock there to be marketed, a lowering of the
311
fees can make few political enemies and many friends.”
Wallace and his lawyers believed they had done all that Chief
Justice Hughes said they should have. The oral argument took an
unexpected turn, though, when the Justices began to focus not on
whether Wallace had read the evidence and made the decision but
rather on how informal the deliberative process was; the Justices
probed topics such as whether the commission men’s lawyers had
seen proposed findings of fact (they had not) and whether they had
been given an opportunity to comment on the material Wallace
312
received (which, again, they had not).
These questions

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 453–54.
Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Mr. Justice Black Dissents, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 29, 1938, at 10.
See Ernst, supra note 144, at 454 (quoting questions at oral argument).
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foreshadowed the decision that Hughes announced six weeks after
the argument.
With the facts in hand, Hughes concluded that the commission
313
men had not in fact had the “full hearing” the statute required.
Invoking the standard Progressive account of the administrative
state’s origins, Hughes emphasized that the “vast expansion of this
field of administrative regulation in response to the pressure of social
needs” had to be accompanied by “adherence to the basic
314
principles.” Those principles included clear legislative guidance to
the agencies Congress created and the rule “that, in administrative
proceedings of a quasi-judicial character, the liberty and property of
the citizens shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
315
play,” which included “a fair and open hearing.” Hughes recited the
facts, contrasting the “voluminous testimony” with the “general and
sketchy oral argument” held when presentation of evidence had
316
concluded. Offering a series of rhetorical negatives, Hughes wrote
that “[n]o brief was at any time supplied by the Government. . . .
[T]he Government formulated no issues and furnished appellants no
317
statement or summary of its contentions and no proposed findings.”
After Wallace had formulated his findings of fact, “[n]o opportunity
was afforded to appellants for the examining of the findings . . . until
318
they were served with the order.” Wallace “did not hear the oral
argument,” and only “dipped into” the “bulky record” from time to
319
time to get its drift.” He read the briefs and the transcript of oral
argument, and had “several conferences” with the department’s chief
320
lawyer and with staff members in the Bureau of Animal Industry.”
321
For Hughes, a full hearing “require[d] more than that.” Such a
hearing required that the parties have “a reasonable opportunity to

313. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). Justices Cardozo and Reed
did not participate in the decision, the former because of illness, Justices of the Supreme Court,
304 U.S. iii, iii n.2 (1938), the latter because he had been involved with the case while he was at
the Department of Justice, see Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 469 (1936) (listing the
attorneys representing the United States).
314. Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 14.
315. Id. at 14–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. Id. at 16.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 24.
319. Id. at 17.
320. Id. at 18.
321. Id.

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s

1619
322

know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.” The
Department of Agriculture’s practice did not offer that reasonable
opportunity. There was “no specific complaint” and no report by the
323
hearing examiner that would help shape the later proceedings.
When Congress required a “full hearing,” it had “judicial standards”
in mind, “not in any technical sense but with respect to those
fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due
324
process.” Fairness was absent, Hughes wrote, when “the plaintiff’s
attorney . . . formulate[d] the findings . . . , [and the judge] conferred
ex parte with the plaintiff’s attorney regarding them, and then
adopted his proposals without affording an opportunity to his
325
opponent to know their contents and present objections.” In a
simple case, perhaps the Secretary—the one who decides—could
preside over a hearing and “make his findings on the spot,” or in a
more complex one, “receive the proposed findings of both parties,
326
each being notified of the proposals of the other.” It was, though, “a
vital defect” and not a mere “irregularity” that Wallace had adopted
the findings prepared by “the active prosecutors for the Government,
after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any
reasonable opportunity to the respondents . . . to know the claims
327
thus presented.”
Hughes finished with a flourish: maintaining “proper standards”
in hearings “in no way cripple[d] or embarrasse[d] the exercise” of an
agency’s power, but actually was “in [its] manifest interest. . . . [I]f
these multiplying agencies . . . [were] to serve the purposes for which
they [had been] created and endowed with vast powers, they must
accredit themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished
328
judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play.” Justice
329
Black, newly appointed to the Court, dissented without opinion.
330
Although Wallace’s initial reaction was temperate —a
statement that the Court’s decision would not affect ratemaking
because the department had already changed its practices—he soon
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26 (Black, J., dissenting).
Wallace on Court Verdict, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1938, at 3.
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331

became upset. Wallace believed that the Court was engaging in a
bait and switch, saying in its initial decision that all it needed to know
was whether Wallace himself had made the decision—which he had—
but saying later that the process in which Wallace had engaged had
denied the commission men “the rudimentary requirements of fair
332
play.” With other New Dealers, he was quite uncertain about what
the Supreme Court was demanding of administrative proceedings. In
round one, the Court had said that it would merely be good practice
to prepare proposed findings of fact and allow the commission men’s
lawyers to read, comment on, and possibly object to them; in round
two, it seemed that the Court might be requiring the preparation of
333
such proposed findings.
Perhaps more important, Hughes’s opinion seemed to cast doubt
on the kind of informal consultations within the bureaucracy that
were almost inevitable, treating them as occasions on which sinister
influences might be exerted rather than as the way in which
bureaucrats with different areas of expertise exchange information
334
and work out solutions to the complex problems handed to them.
And perhaps most important, Wallace saw Hughes’s opinion as
an effort to revive the obstructionism he and his colleagues in the
New Deal thought had been defeated in the prior year’s struggle with
the Court. At a press conference three weeks after the Court’s
decision, Wallace said, “One year ago a great battle was fought to
decide whether the courts could take over the function of determining
policy for the nation. That battle was suspended when the courts
retreated from the legislative field. This year another battle seems to
335
be opening.” A week later, editorialist and constitutional historian
Merlo J. Pusey echoed Wallace’s sense of what was at stake in an
336
editorial column entitled “New Court Fight?” Implicitly drawing
331. New Battle on Power of Court over Agencies Seen by Wallace, WASH. POST, May 19,
1938, at X2.
332. Id.
333. The government’s immediate response to the decision reflected this confusion. The
NLRB withdrew “several noteworthy cases” from the courts because it was concerned that the
absence of an intermediate report from a hearing examiner would vitiate the proceedings.
Labor Board Recalls Cases, Due to Ruling, WASH. POST, May 3, 1938, at X2. The Ford Motor
Company moved for an inquiry into whether NLRB members had “discussed the issues” in the
Board’s case against it with White House advisers and union leaders. Id.
334. See Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22 (discussing procedural requirements of administrative
hearings).
335. New Battle on Power of Court over Agencies Seen by Wallace, supra note 331.
336. Merlo J. Pusey, New Court Fight?, WASH. POST, May 25, 1938, at X9.

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

1621

the same conclusion, the Wall Street Journal editorial page approved
the Court’s “sharp—and apparently needed—warning to all
337
administrative agencies.” That the decision “should have been
necessary,” the editorial continued, was “a sign of the times in which
338
we live.” The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that the decision showed
“that the men and women who fought the court-packing proposal
339
were right.”
Wallace decided to strike back at the Court, conducting his
campaign on two fronts—public opinion and law. He wrote a long
letter to the New York Times describing how he and the Department
of Agriculture had made their decision, and chastising the Court for
using the case as “a convenient peg on which to hang a statement”
that “flash[ed] a warning to quasi-judicial agencies” and threatened to
perpetuate “the interminable delays for which some [corporate
lawyers] are famous.” For Wallace, “The final court of appeal in the
340
United States [was] the bar of public opinion,” and Wallace argued
before that bar through this letter and letters he wrote to every U.S.
341
Senator.
Wallace also pressed Solicitor General Jackson to file a petition
342
for rehearing that would emphasize the bait-and-switch issue. To no
one’s surprise, except perhaps Wallace’s, the Court rejected the
343
petition. The assertion that the decision was “directly contrary” to
337. A Limit to Executive Powers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1938, at 4.
338. Id.
339. Mr. Justice Black Dissents, supra note 311. Pusey modestly criticized Wallace for failing
to have reopened the Kansas City proceedings after the Court’s initial decision in 1936. Pusey,
supra note 336.
340. Secretary Wallace Explains Kansas City Rate Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1938, at 8E.
341. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC. 1922–23 (1938) (reprinting a representative letter from
Wallace).
342. See Ernst, supra note 144, at 448 (“Morgan II and Wallace’s response intensified an
already polemical debate . . . .”).
343. Jackson’s petition for rehearing pointed out another problem with the Court’s decision.
The lower courts had upheld Wallace’s rate reductions, but allowed the commission men to
charge the higher fees and deposit the proceeds with the court, to be returned to the shippers or
the commission men depending on who ultimately won the lawsuit. By 1938, somewhere
between $750,000 and $1 million was sitting in the account. The Court’s opinion said nothing
about what should happen to those funds, and the commission men were pressing that the
money be turned over to them. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). The Court left the
disposition of the money to the lower court. Id. at 428. That decision generated the commission
men’s third trip to the Supreme Court, and the Court’s fourth opinion. This time, though, the
government won—before a Court on which Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Reed sat, though
Reed did not participate in the decision. Id. (upholding the secretary’s distribution of the
accumulated funds).
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the earlier decision was “unwarranted” and “wholly unfounded.”
345
The government was “in no position to claim surprise.” The
question raised by the first decision was whether the commission men
346
had been given a “full hearing.” The Court had mentioned the
possibility of an interim report by the hearing examiner, but it had
347
not required one—nor did the new opinion. What mattered was
fairness in the overall proceeding—and the cumulation of defects,
348
each perhaps tolerable on its own, was the problem.
This, the Court’s third opinion in the matter, eased the burdens
that its second opinion might have placed on the administrative state.
The simplest response would be to have hearing examiners prepare
proposed findings of fact and to make them available to those subject
to regulation. If that occurred, perhaps the informal discussions
disparaged as “ex parte consultations” might be acceptable—a
desirable result for complex cases in which hearing examiners might
need assistance in developing the proposed findings. The
administrative state would be pushed to adopt court-like procedures
at an interim, though important, stage, but agencies would not have to
transform themselves into courts. The adjustments required by
349
Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), as interpreted by the opinion
on rehearing, would undoubtedly slow administrative action. But
those adjustments would not bring the administrative state to a halt
or even cause a dramatic decline in its ability to deal with social and
economic change. The general intrusion of judicial modes of action
had already hobbled the administrative state. No one could call a
ratemaking proceeding that had begun in 1930 and remained open in
1938 expeditious. Morgan II made the situation worse, but only a bit
350
worse.

344. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 23 (1938).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 25.
348. Id. at 25–26.
349. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
350. Ernst, supra note 144, at 448. Ernst also emphasizes the importance Chief Justice
Hughes, in Morgan II, gave to the development of a better trained corps of hearing examiners.
See Ernst, supra note 144, at 449 (describing the opinion as “Hughes’s strong hint that the status
of . . . trial examiners be elevated”).

TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s

3/30/2011 11:58:59 AM

1623

E. Looking Backward and Forward from 1940
The New Deal’s defenders of the modern administrative state
knew they had lost all the important cases the Supreme Court had
decided. Landis leveled acerbic criticisms at the Court; others offered
351
almost equally severe criticisms in more temperate tones. Yet, for
all the criticisms, the New Dealers seemed not to have appreciated
how much ground they had gained. The Court’s major administrative
law decisions were contemporaneous with the decisions that
provoked the crisis of 1936 and 1937, and the Court’s divisions here
mirrored the divisions there—generally along lines conventionally
described as conservative versus liberal. Perhaps the New Dealers
were misled by this fact and distracted by some rhetorical flourishes
in the Court’s opinions. The New Dealers knew that administrative
agencies were not, as Justice Sutherland had suggested in Jones, the
modern version of the Star Chamber. If the Court so seriously
misunderstood how agencies actually operated, New Dealers may
have thought, it could not possibly be sympathetic to the
administrative state at all. Further, the concept of expertise near the
heart of the Progressive vision for administrative law referred to
objective scientific facts. Any departure from deference to expert
judgment was a departure from objective reality, or so the
Progressive theorists may have thought. From that perspective, small
movements away from the status quo toward administrative
autonomy were no better than complete stasis or even regression to a
Diceyan world.
The New Dealers themselves may have misunderstood how far
the Court had gone to accommodate their theory of administrative
law. They had argued that the modern administrative state required
courts to withdraw almost entirely from supervising administrative
agencies. Agency findings of fact, for example, should be completely
binding on the courts. That aspiration was probably unrealistic in a
352
world in which Diceyan ideas still had some purchase. Progressive
theorists had an unrealistic sense of what experts could accomplish, as
their treatment of the idea of a fair rate of return—and their
seemingly willful failure to think seriously about the partisanship of
the NLRB—showed. The Hughes Court may have understood that

351. E.g., Letter from James Landis to Felix Frankfurter, supra note 226.
352. For a discussion of Albert Venn Dicey’s criticisms of the inherent lack of democratic
accountability in administrative regimes, see supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
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the limitations of expertise justified the kind of loose supervision of
the administrative state that it developed. And even the Progressive
theorists of administrative law in the 1930s recognized the continuing
influence of mere—and mean—politics in administrative agencies.
Preserving some role for the courts in supervising agencies could
inhibit any further degeneration of the idealized administrative state
they hoped to embed in the nation’s constitutional scheme.
Still, failing to obtain 100 percent of what they sought was not in
itself a defeat. Each of the “losses” in the Supreme Court allowed
incursions on even a rather weak version of Diceyanism. St. Joseph
353
Stockyards and Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB required the
courts to defer substantially although not completely to agency
findings of fact; the Morgan cases allowed hearing examiners to adopt
rather loose procedures, looser than would have been tolerated from
the ordinary courts to which Diceyans looked. Defenders of the
administrative state might have lost every contentious case, but along
the way they won a substantial amount—not everything, but a great
deal. At the end of the 1930s the administrative state emerged largely
unscathed—and perhaps even strengthened—by the Supreme Court.
By the end of the 1930s Frankfurter was in a position to write an
opinion for the Court restating and endorsing the standard
Progressive account of the rise of the administrative state and the
Progressive vision of administrative procedure. In FCC v. Pottsville
354
Broadcasting Co., the Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia criticizing the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) for failing to adhere to the
instructions that court had given it. As Frankfurter saw it, the lower
court had misunderstood its role when it applied a rule about what
lower courts should do in response to a remand from a higher court.
That rule made sense in its precise setting but was inappropriate
when a court reviewed an agency’s decision. “The technical rules
derived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals . . . are taken
out of their environment when mechanically applied” to review of
355
agency decisions. “Modern administrative tribunals . . . ha[d] been a
response to the felt need of governmental supervision of economic
enterprise—a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither

353. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
354. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). Justice McReynolds concurred in the
result, without opinion. Id. at 146.
355. Id. at 141.
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directly, through self-executing legislation, nor by the judicial
356
process.” Agencies had “power far exceeding and different from the
357
conventional judicial modes for adjusting conflicting claims.” Their
functions in modern government “preclude[d] wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have
358
evolved from the history and experience of courts.” Congressional,
not judicial, supervision was the remedy for abuses: “Congress . . .
must be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal.
Interference by the courts is not conducive to the development of
359
habits of responsibility in administrative agencies.”
Just months after Hughes’s retirement, Justice Reed’s opinion
360
for the Court in Gray v. Powell embodied the Supreme Court’s view
of administrative agencies and sounded all the themes Progressives
361
had articulated. The case involved the Bituminous Coal Division of
the Department of the Interior, which regulated coal production by
setting prices. The statute governing the Division provided an
362
exemption for coal “produced” by the entity that used it. The
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company (Seaboard) leased several
mines from their owners, paying a rent measured by the amount of
coal Seaboard took from the mines. Seaboard then hired an
independent contractor to operate the mines and deliver the coal to
it. The mine operator received a flat rate per ton of coal from
Seaboard, thus, as Justice Reed’s opinion observed, bearing “all the
363
risks of operation.” The Bituminous Coal Division found that
364
Seaboard was not a “producer” exempt from regulation. When the
case reached the Supreme Court, a majority accepted the Division’s
365
conclusion.
Three dissenters argued that the case involved a straightforward
question of statutory interpretation: what did Congress mean when it
said that “producers” of coal for their own use were exempt from
regulation? Justice Reed saw the issue differently. For him, “[T]he
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 146.
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
Id. at 412. Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision. Id. at 417.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 415.
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function of review placed upon the courts . . . [was] fully performed
when they determine[d] that there ha[d] been a fair hearing, with
notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and
arguments to the decisive body, and an application of the statute in a
366
just and reasoned manner.” That “usual administrative routine”
resulted from Congress’s decision to “delegate” the decision to
exempt some producers from regulation “to those whose experience
in a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more
367
equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests.” Contractual
arrangements and ownership were the poles of a continuum between
which were “innumerable variations,” and “[t]o determine upon
which side of the median line the particular instance falls calls for the
368
expert, experienced judgment of those familiar with the industry.”
Committing this kind of decision to “specialized personnel” was “a
369
familiar practice.” Justice Reed concluded, “It is not the province of
a court to absorb the administrative functions to such an extent that
the executive or legislative agencies become mere factfinding bodies
370
deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action.” As law
professor Ray Brown wrote, “[I]n this decision . . . , the old law and
fact criterion . . . has given way to the pragmatic test—which body,
court or administrative agency, has the better expert qualification for
371
deciding the issue presented.”
The Progressive theorists of
administrative law could not have put it better.
Pottsville and Gray show that the Supreme Court had come to
accept nearly the full Progressive vision of administrative law. But
that vision was undergoing some transformation. Progressive theorists
of administrative law had added an important supplement to their
earlier emphasis on expertise alone. The procedures used by
administrative agencies would, as Gellhorn put it, democratize the
agencies by making them—rather than, or at least in addition to,
Congress—the forums for pluralist bargaining among affected
interest groups. Agencies would serve as the representatives of the

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 926 (1943).
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public rather than, or at least in addition to, serving as the vehicles of
372
disinterested professional expertise.
The Supreme Court began to accept the pluralist defense of
agencies in an important decision dealing with who could challenge
administrative action. In the early years of administrative law, courts
allowed regulated entities—those whose legal rights were affected—
373
to obtain judicial review of agency action. The notion of “affecting
legal rights” necessarily required some baseline to identify the legal
374
rights, and courts found that baseline in the common law. In the
ordinary case this posed no difficulties. But as agencies began to
dispense valuable benefits, things changed. Recipients of licenses
were happy to receive them; their competitors were unhappy.
Traditional common law doctrine held, though, that no one had a
375
legal right to be free from competition. Consider an agency that
awarded a license based on a mistaken view of the law, to the
disadvantage of a competitor. With the common law as a baseline, the
competitor could not challenge the agency’s action, and lawlessness
376
would go unchecked.
377
In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, decided in 1940, the
Supreme Court addressed this problem and expanded the class
entitled to challenge agency action as unlawful. The FCC awarded a
378
new license to operate a radio station in Dubuque, Iowa. A
372. See GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 122 (“I submit[] that administrative bodies can and
very frequently do democratize our governmental processes. They can and do bring to the
interests and individuals immediately affected an opportunity to shape the course of regulation,
modeling it to fit the contours of their own special problems. The administrative agency is
providing badly needed machinery enabling the average man ‘to meet government upon his
own level and speak to the governors in the language of his profession or business.’” (quoting E.
PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 19 (1936))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
373. See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1135
(2009) (“[T]he challenger had to identify injury to a ‘legal right’ . . . to establish standing to
challenge administrative action.”).
374. Id. at 1136.
375. See Alexander Sprunt & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 254–55 (1930)
(reasoning that although the plaintiffs’ “competitive advantage was threatened. . . . that interest
alone did not give them the right to maintain an independent suit”); see also Magill, supra note
373, at 1138 (observing that “[t]he elimination of [a] competitive advantage . . . compromised
[no] legal rights” and thus did not confer standing).
376. Cf. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 148–49 (1923)
(holding that a group of lumber manufacturers and dealers lacked standing to challenge the
ICC’s decision to cancel a “penalty charge” on their competitors).
377. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
378. Id. at 471.
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competing radio station across the Mississippi River intervened in the
FCC proceeding, contending that the area could not generate enough
379
advertising revenue to support two stations. The FCC disagreed,
380
and the competitor went to court.
A unanimous Supreme Court held, first, that the competitor was
entitled to seek judicial review of the agency’s decision even though it
had suffered no injury to a right protected by the common law. The
Court then held that the statute did not require the FCC to take
381
competitive injury into account when awarding licenses. The statute
gave a right to seek review to “any . . . person aggrieved or whose
382
interests are adversely affected” by agency action. A radio station
already operating in an area was “adversely affected” when a new
station started to operate, even though it was not protected from
383
competition by the common law. Congress, the Court held, could
give competitors a right to obtain judicial review because “[i]t may
have been of [the] opinion that one likely to be financially injured by
the issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law”
384
in the agency’s action.
Sanders Bros. exposes several aspects of administrative law near
the end of Hughes’s tenure. By expanding the class of entities entitled
to seek judicial review of agency action, the Supreme Court gave the
courts a continuing role in supervising the administrative state.
Although competitors might not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of statutes that put them at a competitive
385
disadvantage, they could challenge agency decisions doing so.
Sanders Brothers’s intervention in the FCC proceeding confirmed
that the agency was a venue for the kind of give and take among
interest groups that had become characteristic in modern legislatures.
Indeed, one might see the standing decisions near the end of the

379. Id. at 471–72.
380. Id. at 472.
381. Id. at 473–74.
382. Id. at 476.
383. Id. at 477.
384. Id. Justice McReynolds did not participate in the decision. Id. at 478.
385. See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 140 (1939) (holding that
the appellant’s argument that the statutes at issue were unconstitutional “is foreclosed by prior
decisions that the damage consequent on competition, otherwise lawful, is in such circumstances
damnum absque injuria, and will not support a cause of action or right to sue”).
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Hughes Court as suggesting that the location of pluralist give and
take had shifted from the legislature to the agencies.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OUTSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
Progressive administrative law theory seemed to have triumphed
in the Supreme Court. But the story in the organized legal profession
and in Congress was a less happy one for Progressives. This Part
concludes the examination of administrative law in the 1930s by
describing the political reaction to the developments in the Supreme
Court, a reaction so hostile to the Progressive vision that Progressive
scholars perhaps should have reevaluated their criticisms of the
Court’s decisions. If their opponents thought that drastic changes
were needed in administrative law, the Progressives might have said
to themselves, perhaps the Court had given them a great deal of what
they wanted.
Administrative law in the 1920s and early 1930s embodied a
compromise among Progressive advocates of administrative
autonomy, courts concerned about preserving traditional safeguards
of individual rights (and their own power), lawyers who sought to
preserve their role in the new administrative order by insisting that it
have some degree of legalization, and corporate interests who saw in
administrative law an acceptable tradeoff between the costs of
adjudication and expeditious disposition of cases. That compromise
came under pressure in the 1930s. The administrative state expanded
dramatically, creating constituencies supporting the new
bureaucracies and, not incidentally, supporting the Roosevelt
administration. The Supreme Court increasingly accepted the
Progressive vision of administrative law, and a new cadre of lawyers
moved into the nation’s administrative bureaucracies, forming a
counterweight to the segments of the bar representing corporate
interests. The traditional elite bar sought to reestablish the older
equilibrium by supplanting administrative law as developed by the
Supreme Court with a more comprehensive statutory framework.
Dismayed by what he took to be the influence of political
patronage on awarding radio licenses, which he had observed after he
served as the first general counsel to the FCC, Louis G. Caldwell
persuaded the American Bar Association’s (ABA) president to
appoint a special committee on administrative law to examine the
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role lawyers and courts could play in controlling agencies. Caldwell
became the new committee’s chair just as the New Deal invigorated
387
administrative government. The committee’s initial forays were
quite modest, turning the Progressive theory of the administrative
state guided by science and expert knowledge to its own purposes by
proposing that Congress create a specialized and expert
388
administrative court with, however, a quite limited jurisdiction. This
proposal was the hobbyhorse of Kentucky “colonel” Ollie Roscoe
McGuire, a self-promoting critic of the New Deal who had
collaborated with James M. Beck on a book whose title—Our
389
Wonderland of Bureaucracy—suggests its argument.
McGuire
occasionally framed his quite modest proposal with references to
“[d]ictators [who] may walk across the stages of foreign lands,” but
390
his rhetoric outran his proposal. McGuire also got the ear of
391
Senator Mills Logan of Kentucky, who had served as that state’s
392
chief justice for a few months before his election to the Senate.
Logan regularly introduced bills brought to him by McGuire dealing
with administrative law, seeing them as compatible with Logan’s
393
general support for the New Deal.
McGuire took over as chair of the special committee in 1937, and
began a campaign for more substantial revisions in administrative
394
law. The committee proposed that all administrative agencies adopt
highly judicialized internal mechanisms of review, with deferential
395
judicial review to follow. The ABA endorsed these proposals in
principle in 1937, although only after Washington lawyers had
restructured them to exempt the most established agencies from their
386. This discussion draws heavily on Daniel R. Ernst, Roscoe Pound and the Administrative
State (forthcoming) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
387. Id. (manuscript at 26).
388. See id. (manuscript at 16) (explaining Pound’s belief that lawyers “should use ‘the new
economics and the social science of today’ to renovate the common law” (quoting Roscoe
Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 117 (1914))).
389. Id. (manuscript at 28).
390. O.R. McGuire, Federal Administrative Action and Judicial Review, 22 A.B.A. J. 492,
492 (1936).
391. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1578 (1996).
392. Logan, Marvel Mills, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000404 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
393. For a more detailed description of one of the proposals, see O.R. McGuire, Proposed
Reforms in Judicial Reviews of Federal Administrative Action, 19 A.B.A. J. 471 (1933).
394. Ernst, supra note 386 (manuscript at 28–29).
395. Id. (manuscript at 30).
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396

requirements. Dismayed at the direction the committee had taken,
Arthur Vanderbilt, the ABA’s president-elect in 1936, replaced
397
McGuire as committee chair with Roscoe Pound, who had recently
398
stepped down as dean of Harvard Law School. Pound had a
reputation as a Progressive-era defender of administrative
governance, which he understood as embodying the compromise
between technical expertise and lawyers’ influence on agency
399
procedures.
The special committee’s report had a schizophrenic character. Its
“general report,” Pound’s distinctive contribution, offered a pointed
attack on “administrative absolutism” bolstered by references to
400
practices around the world. Punctuated by important insights into
the real world of administrative action, the general report’s
intellectual force was undermined by its use of the term
“administrative absolutism” to describe the strongest versions of the
Progressive theory of administrative law. This failed to acknowledge
that, whatever their aspirations, the Progressive theorists had come to
an accommodation with the Diceyan tradition. That accommodation,
indeed, might have been seen in the committee’s recommended
statute, which was hardly commensurate with this critique, and even
the committee’s discussion of the statute was significantly qualified.
The committee rejected the “reactionary position” of eliminating
large amounts of administrative decisionmaking, but “insist[ed]” that
“safeguarding individual interests and preserving the checks and
balances inherent in the common law doctrine of the supremacy of
law” was consistent with the “large and . . . increasing rôle” of such
401
decisionmaking.
Because “[a]dministration, with its ideal and
function of getting things done,” had “a tendency to act from one
402
side,” it needed to be balanced from the other. Drawing upon
396. Id. (manuscript at 19–20).
397. Id. (manuscript at 33).
398. Id. (manuscript at 28).
399. See id. (manuscript at 100) (“The early Pound thought that courts had ‘tied down
administration too rigidly’ in the nineteenth century. . . . Pound wanted ‘a simple, direct, and
inexpensive mode of review,’ not to substitute the discretion of the administrative body but to
ensure that administrators ‘hear both sides, act upon evidence and keep within the limits of the
law.’” (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to Francis E. Walter (May 18, 1939))).
400. See Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331,
342–45 (1938) (arguing that administrative absolutism is antithetical to American governmental
values by offering Soviet Russia, Australia, and England as counterpoints).
401. Id. at 342.
402. Id.
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Progressive ideas about modern society, the committee continued,
“The more complex a society, the more and more numerous and
complex the relations and groups and associations of which it is made
up, the more complicated becomes the task of adjusting their
403
conflicting and overlapping interests and clashing activities.” This
could not be achieved within the administrative structure, contrary to
the position taken by administrative absolutism, which maintained
the “ideal” of “a highly centralized administration set upon complete
control of the executive for the time being, relieved of judicial review
404
and making its own rules.” Composed of practicing lawyers and an
academic no longer attuned to developments in the American theory
of administrative law, the committee did not glimpse, as Gellhorn
would, the outlines of a reconfiguration of administrative law in its
third phase as providing a location within the administrative state for
pluralist bargaining.
The committee then mounted a challenge to the heart of the
Progressive vision of administrative agencies. Quoting Landis on the
“scientific” character of administrative inquiries, the committee used
the example of the NLRB to question the idea that administrative
hearings were calm and uncontentious. It also used that same
example and that of deportation hearings to question the idea that
405
administrative decisionmaking was “inherently scientific.” These
observations supported the committee’s regular description of
agencies as under executive rather than professional or expert
control: “[t]he postulate of a scientific body of experts pursuing
objective scientific inquiries [was] as far as possible from what the
facts [were] or [were] likely to be in a polity where the administrative
bodies [were] . . . both by tradition and by legislation . . . subjected to
406
centralized executive control.” For the committee, “In many fields
of administration there [was] no particular expertness,” whether at
the level of the line officials charged with direct administration or at
407
the level of the agency heads appointed for political reasons. “The
professed ideal of an independent commission of experts above
politics and reaching scientific results by scientific means, ha[d] no

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id.
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
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The committee described how
correspondence with reality.”
agencies were created to serve narrow political goals: “this very
subjection to politics . . . [was] often not the least reason for setting up
administrative agencies in the minds of those who wish[ed] to see
some particular subject put under the control of some particular
409
group or interest.”
Against the false claims of administrative expertise, the
committee set the professional standards of the legal profession and
the judiciary. These standards offset “tendencies” in agency
decisionmaking, such as decisions without a full hearing or decisions
made on the basis of evidence not formally presented. The committee
agreed that “agencies should not be held to purely judicial
procedure,” particularly rules of evidence that had developed to
410
regulate proceedings in which lay jurors were the decisionmakers.
That, though, made full judicial review even more important. Citing
Sharfman’s praise of the Interstate Commerce Commission for
“safeguard[ing] all essential rights and interests,” the committee said
that there was “evidence” that this had occurred “largely because the
411
courts have compelled the Commission to do so.”
The report then shifted gears, defending the rise of the
administrative state and criticizing “extreme” court decisions in the
late nineteenth century that resulted in “[s]omething very like a
412
paralysis of administration by judicial order or judicial review.” This
“bad adjustment” resulted from “too much check upon
administration,” followed by a “reaction” that provided no
regularized accommodation of administration “as part of the legal
order” and a failure of “systematic” allocation of authority between
413
agencies and courts. Rather than administrative absolutism, the
solution lay in better court supervision of agencies. What was needed,
the committee said, was “unification and simplification” of judicial
414
review. A single statute dealing with judicial review of agency action

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 359.
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should replace the confusing set of traditional remedies that had
415
“grown up haphazard[ly].”
In 1938, Senator Logan introduced an even more modest version
of his originally modest proposal for an administrative court, but
members of the ABA special committee testified against it. The
Roosevelt administration temporized. In early 1939, Attorney
General Frank Murphy appointed a Committee on Administrative
Procedure to assess the situation and, if appropriate, to propose new
legislation. Gellhorn directed the committee’s research, which
included interviews with agency heads and staff members. The staff
regarded the ABA committee, and Pound in particular, as offering
“reform” proposals that derived not from serious inquiry into the
failings of the existing system but from political predisposition and
416
prejudice.
The Attorney General’s committee faced a new threat, as the
New Dealers saw things. Senator Logan had found an ally in the

415. Id. The committee’s proposed statute followed immediately after the general report,
and anyone who read the material in the order presented would have been struck by the
mismatch between the two. Some of its rhetoric aside, the committee’s general report was an
astute and realistic treatment of the modern realities of administration, in contrast to the
idealizations offered in the 1930s by the Progressive theorists of administrative law. Because it
was produced by complex, almost desperate negotiations that Pound himself refused explicitly
to endorse, the statute proposed in the committee’s report had little connection to that realism.
As in previous incarnations, the recommended statute would require each agency head to
appoint an “intra-departmental board” as an internal appeals panel, operating in the way a
court would, with testimony, subpoena power, a right to cross-examination, and the like. Id. at
336. Here the special committee noted that “there [was] much to be said on both sides.” Id.
Internal review could be “elastic” and would “regularize[] within the departments what is now
largely the actual present procedure.” Id. at 336–37. Yet multiple levels of review were generally
undesirable and might reinforce the idea that agency officials had the final word on their own
actions. Id. at 337. Agency decisions would be subject to review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 366. The standard of review was not significantly different from the one
the Supreme Court had already developed: “[n]o decision . . . shall be set aside . . . unless it
appears that the findings are clearly erroneous or are not supported by substantial evidence, or
that the decision . . . is not supported by the findings, . . . or was based on arbitrary and
capricious findings of facts, or . . . infringes the Constitution or statutes of the United States.” Id.
at 367. The committee somehow understood this provision to be sufficient to combat
administrative absolutism. The most that can be said for it is that the proposal made review of
factfindings mandatory, not discretionary, and required more than “some evidence” to support
such findings. Id. at 338. Seemingly aware of the mismatch between the rhetorical nervousness
about administrative absolutism and the modesty of the actual proposals, the committee
observed that its proposed standard of review “gives an enormous power to administrative
officials . . . without the checks which operate in the case of the judge.” Id.
416. For a description of the committee’s work, see generally Kenneth C. Davis & Walter
Gellhorn, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511
(1986).
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House of Representatives—Francis Walter of Pennsylvania. The
Walter-Logan bill, introduced in April 1939, rapidly gained ground in
Congress. Unsurprisingly, testimony from twelve existing agencies
opposed the bill. One testified that the bill’s procedural proposals
would “very seriously hamper the efficient operation” of the
417
agencies. The administration’s efforts failed, and Logan reported
the bill to the Senate, saying that the bill would “stem and, if
possible, . . . reverse the drift into parliamentarism which, if it should
succeed . . . , could but result in totalitarianism . . . with the entire
subordination of both the legislative and judicial branches of the
418
Federal Government to the executive branch.” Representative
Walter had his House committee approve the bill in late 1939. The
committee report described some “bureaucrats” who were
“contemptuous of both the Congress and the courts; disregardful of
the rights of the governed; and for lack of sufficient legal control over
419
New Dealer
them, a few develop Messiah complexes.”
Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York filed a dissenting
report, saying that it was wrong to adopt a general administrative law
measure to deal with the isolated misdeeds of one or two agencies.
Celler specifically mentioned the NLRB and the Labor Department’s
420
Wage and Hour Division.
The debates over the bill’s adoption made clear that the bill was
a challenge to the New Deal. As the bill evolved, its coverage was
restricted. Older agencies such as the ICC were exempted, leaving
only the newer, New Deal agencies affected. As one opponent put it,
the bill with its exemptions
[left] out those agencies that were built up back yonder to serve
special interests . . . but when it [came] to those agencies that ha[d]
been set up within the last ten years, . . . that gave the citizen some
rights he should have enjoyed for the last 50 years, this bill would
421
paralyze those agencies.”

Proponents referred to the need to prevent Roosevelt from becoming
a dictator, and to the Soviet Union as the kind of nation that lacked

417. Shepherd, supra note 391, at 1559 (quoting the testimony of Chester Lane, General
Counsel, SEC).
418. Id. at 1601.
419. Id. at 1604.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1618 (quoting 86 CONG. REC. 5491 (1940) (statement of Rep. Rankin)).
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protections like those in the Walter-Logan bill. They criticized New
Deal agencies for the very speed and efficiency that Progressive
theorists of administrative law saw as among agencies’ best
423
characteristics. New Dealers in Congress tried to defeat the bill
partly on the ground that it was a veiled attack on the New Deal, and
partly because, they said, the Attorney General’s committee was
likely to produce a better proposal. The crucial vote in the House was
on a motion to send the bill back to committee. The motion failed by
a vote of 272 to 106, after which the House adopted the bill on April
18, 1940, by a vote of 282 to 96, with support from Republicans and
some Southern Democrats. Senator Logan had died in October 1939,
and the bill’s passage in the Senate in November by a two-vote
424
margin was something of a tribute to him.
As he had promised, Roosevelt vetoed the Act when it came to
his desk. He criticized both “lawyers [who] still prefer to distinguish
precedent and to juggle leading cases rather than to get down to the
merits,” and “powerful interests which are opposed to reforms that
can only be made effective through the use of the administrative
425
tribunal.” He said that he “could not conscientiously approve any
bill which would turn the clock backwards and place the entire
functioning of the Government at the mercy of never-ending
lawsuits,” and he expressed his hope that the Attorney General’s
426
committee would generate recommendations he could support. The
House failed to override the veto.
The Attorney General’s committee submitted its report a month
later, in January 1941. Three of the committee’s twelve members
offered a statute that would require courts to reverse agency decisions
that were “clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,”
rather than allowing them to affirm decisions using a nearly toothless

422. See id. at 1581 (“Because of developments in Europe, the fears that Roosevelt sought
dictatorial powers were often real.”).
423. See id. at 1590–91 (“Before, proponents of administrative reform had characterized
their proposals as scientific, nonpartisan attempts to restore constitutional balance and to
improve agencies’ efficiency and accountability. Now, employing rhetoric that likened
opposition to administrative reform to communism and fascism, Pound’s committee attacked
the New Deal agencies.”).
424. Id. at 1619. For a summary of the debates, see id. at 1606–25.
425. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RETURNING WITHOUT
APPROVAL THE BILL (H.R. 6324) ENTITLED “AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” H.R.
DOC. NO. 76-986, at 3 (1940), reprinted in 86 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1940).
426. Id. at 3–4.
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“substantial evidence” test. They also suggested that Congress should
adopt a general statute dealing with administrative procedure, to be
followed if necessary by modifications to deal with the peculiar
requirements of specific agencies. The committee’s majority
recommended a modest bill that would have restructured internal
agency operations in some important ways but that said nothing
427
about judicial review of agency decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Progressive vision for administrative law had the courts
withdrawing almost completely from the supervision of
administrative agencies. As the Supreme Court gradually accepted
most of that vision, it chose to give up its ability to control the
direction of administrative law’s development. The parts of that
forbearance that resulted from the constitutional transformation of
1937 were permanent. The parts that were “pure” administrative
law—interpretations of the statutes establishing the agencies—were
not. Congress could reverse the Hughes Court’s abandonment of
judicial control over administrative law. Eventually it did. As of 1941,
though, that outcome could only barely be seen.

427. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 211 (1941).

